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The Emergence of Large, Unitary Merchant-Banks in Dugento Tuscany  
 
1. Introduction 
 The idea of the “corporation”, in its modern sense of a joint-stock company with 
limited liability, was far from existence in the Middle Ages. Then there was no limited 
liability, no stock market, no Industrial Revolution with factory production. Still, 
economic historians do speak of a Commercial Revolution in the ‘long 1200s’ of the late 
1100s into the 1300s.1 Along with the formation of the internationally oriented 
Champagne fairs in France, the rise of the large unitary merchant-bank in Tuscany ranks 
among the most important features of this Commercial Revolution.2 Instead of nationally 
diverse merchants traveling with their wares to and from central markets in France, a 
network of more-or-less-permanent branch offices developed in the mid-1200s, with 
Italian (mostly Tuscan) sedentary merchant-bankers in their geographically distributed 
filiali or branches effecting movements of goods and currency through letters among 
themselves. Despite geographical dispersion, the company was ‘unitary’ in the two legal 
senses of a single partnership structure, with different partners often heading different 
branches, and of a single ‘master’ account book, located in the head office back home, in 
which all activities were tabulated and held accountable. An impressive list of early 
innovations in basic business technique followed this “rise of the sedentary merchant”3: 
business letters, complex account books, and bills of exchange that moved money 
without moving metal.4  
                                                 
1 Lopez, de Roover, Spufford, Goldthwaite, others. 
2 I will not analyze in this paper the opening of trading routes to the Levant, which involved Genoa, Venice 
and Pisa, even though these eastern trade routes provided part of the flow of trade underneath of the 
Commercial Revolution. This flow from the east involved spices and other luxury goods. Florence, Siena 
and Lucca were more centrally involved in the countervailing flow from the west, involving woolen textiles 
produced in Flanders, and later in Florence, and silk textiles produced in Lucca. During the height of the 
Champagne fairs, Genoese merchants participated in both sides of these trade flows. Geographically 
distributed Tuscan merchant-banks, however, gradually displaced the Champagne fairs in the late 1200s. 
3 Gras, Sapori 
4 De Roover 
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Beneath these fundamental innovations in business technique achieved by the 
early Italian sedentary merchant-bankers of the 1200s (the so-called Dugento), I 
maintain, laid the organizational invention of the corporation – not in its modern sense of 
joint-stock ownership, but in its medieval sense of corporate body. Sedentary merchant-
bankers were still business partners in principal-agent alliance; but they also became 
representatives of a collective enterprise with geographical spread, temporal depth, and 
corporate liability. 
The English word “corporation” is descended from the Latin corpus or body. In 
the context of the Italian medieval company,5 the corpo was the starting capital 
contributed by its founding partners (compagnie or soci). Operationally, corpo was used 
to initiate a joint financial account (ragione sociale), in which the economic transactions 
and financial obligations of all the partners were effected and registered. The ragione 
sociale implemented in a practical way two organizational ideas: (a) unlimited liability of 
the partners, and (b) corporate economic existence, above and beyond that of its 
constitutive members.6 In medieval language, the rise of the “corporation” meant a move 
from an alliance of companions or compagnie, with fluid partners, to the corporate body 
of a società, with stationary branches or filiali. The legal form of the partnership contract 
did not change, but there was a new sense and a new reality of continuity through time – 
continuity through generational tine – that did not exist before. 
Simple quantitative indicators of the phenomenon being discussed are the 
numbers of partners and employees. In Champagne fairs of early 1200s, not really 
‘corporations’ or societas, but just companies or compagnie… Merchant-banks of this 
era, as will be demonstrated below, reached sizes of… Later partnership systems of the 
Medici era involved numbers of partners in range…7 Hence the unitary merchant-banks 
being discussed were the largest European economic organizations recorded in medieval 
and Renaissance times. 
                                                 
5 The word “company”, in turn, descends from compagnie or companions. As I will explain later in this 
paper, the organizational terms compagnia and società had elastic meanings in the Middle Ages, going well 
beyond the domains of economic production and exchange. 
6 Sapori on third parties. 
7 De Roover has some of these numbers in Medici book. 
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This organizational invention of the corporation in its medieval sense, I hope to 
demonstrate, was induced by the mobilization of the market, in the form of the 
Champagne fairs, by the Catholic church for purposes of state finance – namely, to fund 
its Italian ‘crusades’ against the Holy Roman Emperor. Religion bridged state and market 
through war. Some crucial preliminary business techniques were invented in the fluid-
merchant world of the Champagne fairs.8 But the basic organizational drive toward 
sedentary filiali, I shall strive to demonstrate, was imprinted on the market by the visible 
hand of the Church. On a practical level, landed church assets were spread all over 
Europe, transcending the national boundaries of kingdoms. Asset dispersion in the 
“universal church” required comparable geographical dispersion among the Church’s 
financial agents. And on an ideological level, the fundamental Augustinian “two body” 
conception of human community – living simultaneously on earth and on the way to 
heaven – attempted to impose an impersonal office conception of organization onto the 
deeply personalistic world of European feudalism. The mechanism of ideological 
influence on economic organization was not prescriptive command, or even simpatico 
mimesis. It was the dual functionality of private merchant and papal administrator – in 
other words, being embedded in two worlds at once.  
I shall call this mechanism of organizational invention “extension and 
absorption.” On the side of the state, the market of private merchants (mercatores) was 
administratively absorbed into the pope’s curia (in nostra camera) to make papal finance. 
On the market side, partnerships of companions (compagnie) were extended to make 
corporations (societas) in the form of private unitary merchant-banks, which operated in 
and began to dominate9 international trade.  
Working in church finance was only part of what the large Tuscan merchant-
banks did. But this aspect of their activity altered, I shall argue, the trajectory of their 
economic development. In their generative birth, large sedentary merchant-banks were 
induced by the fusion of two institutions that preceded them – the Champagne fairs and 
the Church. 
                                                 
8 In particular the idea and methods of procurator or agent. See Face (1957) and Berlow (1971). 
9 So much so that the Champagne fairs that spawned them were eventually driven out of business. 
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In this chapter, I shall develop this thesis about the organizational invention of 
medieval banks in the following stages: After this introduction, I shall present a very 
brief literature review, just to place my thesis in historiographical context. Next, I state 
my argument in “mechanisms of invention” terms compatible with the goals of this 
volume. In a fourth section, I offer a macro-historical survey of the primary political and 
economic events of this period – including both the rise of the Champagne fairs on the 
‘purely economic’ front, and the Italian crusades or wars between the Pope and the Holy 
Roman Emperor on the ‘purely political’ front. My co-evolutionary narrative seeks to 
identify the intersection of these two streams of development, tracing consequences for 
both state and market. In a fifth section, I present an organizational analysis of the 
development of partnership structures among Italian merchant-bankers, as observed and 
coded from the papal registers of 1243 to 1268. In a sixth section, I derive some 
consequences of this organizational form for the evolution of the patrician family. The 
conclusion will provide a brief coda. 
 
2. Previous literature 
There are quite a few specialist studies of particular companies and towns, mostly 
written in languages other than English. Curiously, much of the intensive work of this 
type was done early in the twentieth century, apparently now having gone out of favor, at 
least outside of Italy. I shall utilize these valuable case studies in the fifth section below. 
 At the level of broad synthesis, there is not as much, with only a few authors 
being heavily cited by everyone else. Being economic historians, these synthetic authors 
explain the rise of merchant-banks through economic factors alone. Robert Lopez (1952, 
1971) coined the term “Commercial Revolution.” The sweep of his vision was vast, but 
he laid his emphasis on the traditional themes of trade opening to the east and the 
consequent rise of the Champagne fairs, as well as on the theme of improvement in 
agriculture. Genoa, Venice, and shipping loomed large in his account. Raymond de 
Roover (1963), without exactly contradicting Lopez, laid his emphasis instead on the 
‘internal’ development of superior business techniques. The Tuscan merchant-banks 
became the culmination of the Commercial Revolution in de Roover’s focus, but the 
Church and war were not part of his discussion. Peter Spufford (1988) is a monetarist 
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who emphasized the discovery, in the late 1100s, of large volumes of silver in Germany 
and to a lesser extent in Italy, outside of Siena. Spufford’s monetarist focus was fresh, but 
it applies to a earlier period than the topic of this chapter. Without denying in any way 
their importance to macroeconomic takeoff, agriculture, trade and silver are simply 
assumed as background in this chapter. My focus instead is on organizational form. 
Armando Sapori (1955, 1970), more than anyone else, has studied the large, 
unitary merchant-banks that are the topic of this chapter. His work is the point of 
departure for this chapter. Based on much close study, Sapori proposed that Italian 
unitary merchant-banks emerged through three stages of development:10 First, according 
to Sapori, companies were built on the basis of families. Second, family companies 
reached out to recruit outside partners, in order to extend their startup capital (corpo). 
Finally, family-plus-outsiders mobilized depositors, to extend their working capital (even 
though that sopracorpo did not technically count as corpo). This simple developmental 
scheme, driven by growth in capital, will provide a “null hypothesis” against which my 
own alternative, more political, account can be evaluated.  
 In my own data on merchant-banks appearing in the papal registers of the mid 
1200s, to be presented in section five below, I shall find problems with this 
developmental scheme. It is not that I shall find no relationship between family and 
company. But I shall find the causality reversed: instead of Sapori’s “company emerging 
out of family,” I shall find rather “family emerging out of company.” The family-alliance 
(consorteria) hypothesis of Blomquist11 I believe accurately describes the initial structure 
of the mid-Dugento Tuscan merchant banks. From that beginning, family reproduction of 
partners within the banks, through generational time, transformed merchant nuclear 
families into magnate patrilineages. The relative dominance of a single ‘noble’ family 
within the bank thereby grew. Challenging someone with the authority and depth of 
knowledge of Sapori is not to be done lightly, but I shall report my findings and leave it 
to future research to sort through any apparent contradictions.  
 This papal explanation for the birth of the Italian unitary merchant-bank is 
original in the historiograophical literature, to the best of my knowledge.  
                                                 
10 Sapori (1970, pp. 45-49) 
11 Blomquist ( , pp. ) 
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3. Mechanism of Organizational Invention: “Extension and Absorption” 
 Stated at an abstract level suitable for this comparative volume, the mechanism of 
organizational invention I find illustrated by this Dugento Italian case is “extension and 
absorption.” Namely, small and fluid organizational forms of partnership, originally 
adapted to the Champagne-fair world of the market, were extended into the new domain 
of state finance – first by the pope in the 1260s, and second by the English king in the 
1270s – and then were absorbed (partially) into their respective state fiscal machineries. 
Organizational invention ensued: Fluid and temporary partnerships evolved into 
“corporations” (società), in the medieval sense of that word defined above. To repeat the 
definition: (a) a unitary corpo and ragione sociale that outlived its contributing partners, 
with (b) sedentary and more-or-less permanent geographical branches or filiali. Legally, 
the partnership contract, with its implicit unlimited liability, was elastic enough12 to 
absorb this fundamental change in organizational form, without requiring any change in 
Roman law.13  
 In my previous research on Renaissance Florence, summarized and extended in 
the next two chapters, I discovered two other multiple-network mechanisms for inventing 
new forms of organization: namely, “transposition and refunctionality” and “robust 
action.” All three of these organizational-invention mechanisms involve recombining 
different types of pre-existing networks in new ways. Hybridity and multiple 
functionality, achieved through various means, are common features across these three 
mechanisms. “New ideas,” coming out of nowhere, are not.14  
                                                 
12 Indeed, as will be discussed below, “partnership” was an organizational concept that could be extended 
to other than economic purposes – for example, military militias (societas militum), family alliances 
(consorterie), and joint-ownership tower societies (società delle torri). 
13 For an analogous elastic expansion, in nineteenth-century America, of the legal template of “commercial 
contract” to cover the radically different meanings of merchant custom, ‘meeting of the wills,’ and 
standardized obligations, see Horwitz (xxxx). 
14 For this reason, I dismiss the concept of “genius” or “great man” as a scientific explanation, even if such 
a person exists. The use of even tamer versions of such labels generally implies that the researcher has not 
understood social context deeply enough to uncover the exact sequence of moves that were made. 
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 Innovation does not necessarily mean “it works.” To survive beyond an 
antiquarian curiosity, any organizational innovation must first fit into, and be reproduced 
by, the autocatalytic flows out of which it emerged. This is the meaning of “selection” in 
an autocatalytic network context.15 If those flows themselves are altered, then the word 
(systemic) invention is warranted, above and beyond just the word (organizational) 
innovation. “Innovation” is a new form of organization or artifact. “Invention” is a 
system tip induced by that innovation – a change in the selection regime that reproduces 
that innovation.16 When, as in this case, there are two flows being combined – e.g., 
international trade flows, centered on the Champagne fairs, and state finance flows, 
centered on popes and kings –  then the dual-functionality innovation must be reproduced 
by two (not necessarily consistent) flows at once. Innovation in banks would become 
invention in banking17 if the emergence of the new organizational form of bank 
transformed both the international-trade flows and the state-finance flows in which it 
participated, in some way that reproduced that organizational form.  
Dugento Tuscan merchant-banks qualify as an invention because they altered, 
without interrupting, international trade flows. The geographical dispersion of sedentary 
merchants in their interconnected filiali delivered luxury goods and textiles to (high end) 
consumers more directly than did the traditional market of the Champagne fairs. The 
Champagne fairs gradually declined in the late 1200s and early 1300s, inversely with the 
rise of the sedentary merchants. This alteration in international trade flows did not occur 
suddenly – first merchant trade at the Champagne fair declined in the late 1200s, but 
currency exchange continued; only in the early 1300s did currency exchange itself at the 
Champagne fairs decline, leading to the extinction of the fairs. 
Dugento Tuscan merchant-banks also qualify as an invention because they 
altered, without interrupting, state finance. Individual Italian bankers (campsores) gave 
short-term loans to popes even before the rise of the large, unitary merchant-banks. With 
the help of the newly emergent merchant-banks, however, popes and later the English 
                                                 
15 This meaning has more in common with the biologists’ conception of ‘fitness’ as relative reproduction 
than it does with the economists’ conception of ‘fitness’ as relative performance.  
16 Padgett and McLean (2006, pp. xxx). 
17 I thank Walter Fontana for suggesting this terminology of banks versus banking. 
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king could assemble money for their armies more quickly, taking loans from their Italian 
bankers in anticipation of extraordinary tax assessments, which were collected slowly and 
painfully. Merchant-bankers were repaid, with disguised interest, from these state 
collections, as substantial tax revenues came in later. Because of this financial 
arrangement, Italian merchant-banks became insinuated into the budding state-finance 
administrative machineries of their sponsors. 
The English king Edward I in the 1270s introduced a wrinkle into this loans-
against-future-taxes financial system, originally invented by the popes, which was to 
have enormous consequences for the developing economy of Florence. Mercantilist 
English law prohibited the export of precious metal from the kingdom, so loans to the 
English king had to be repaid in raw wool, coming largely from monasteries. The 
introduction of a new English customs system, with Italian merchant-bankers 
participating in its administration, was the innovative solution for achieving this 
repayment. Organizational innovation in papal banking redounded into organizational 
invention in English state fiscal administration, which supported the original banking 
innovation. The enormous consequence for the Florentine economy was the diversion of 
high-quality English wool exports from their original destination of Flanders to the newly 
developing textile industry of Florence. Florence thereby came to displace Flanders as the 
primary center for wool-textile production in Europe. 
With this new macroeconomic link between wool textiles and state finance came 
high merchant profits to couple with enormous (but risky) banking profits. The large 
unitary merchant-banks entered a self-sustaining “takeoff” phase, with steady merchant 
business anchoring their highly volatile state-finance business.  
A final autocatalytic flow involved people, not money. Originally, Italian bankers 
were smallish money changers, often but not always Jewish, tainted with the odor of 
usury. Participation in international trade could improve their social prestige from mere 
domestic money changers to international merchant-bankers – a considerable climb in 
social mobility, though still far below the rank of nobility. In the fluid stage of the early 
1200s, traveling Italian merchants clustered abroad in expatriate communities and 
neighborhoods called nazioni, with the permission of local potentates. Social bonds 
within nazioni could become close – the social foundation for economic cooperation 
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among overseas nationals – but in the early period local potentates did not grant 
permission to stay in their territory for more than three or four months at a time.  
With the mid-1200s rise of the large, unitary merchant-banks, however, 
international merchant-bankers became associated with popes and kings. Such 
legitimation and protection attracted substantial deposits from lay and clerical 
aristocracies all over Europe. A ‘multiplier effect’ on the growth of capital thus kicked in, 
a point that Sapori in particular has emphasized. My compatible point from a social 
mobility perspective is such customers gave to successful leaders of large, unitary 
merchant-banks a plausible claim for noble status for themselves.18 This is my finding of 
“family coming out of company.” Successful bankers in unitary banks became noble-
mimicking patrilineages, through bringing sons and relatives into the bank, and through 
purchasing property in their native city and in its countryside.19 This social consolidation 
contributed to the longevity and ‘corporate’ character of the bank: company corpo 
became part of family patrimony. It also integrated bankers into the ruling patriciate of 
their city. 
Once audacious claims by merchants to noble status were recognized by their 
feudal peers, then a spillover occurred into Italian elite family structure. A subset of 
Italian feudal nobility became more mercantile than their French, English and German 
counterparts. In the tumultuous politics of the 1200s (to be described below), fragile 
Italian communal elites had every incentive to reach out for sympathetic allies, as long as 
the volume of such families was not too substantial. This process of gradual and highly 
restricted20 social absorption reached point in Florence that merchant families like the 
Bardi and the Cerchi were declared to be magnates in 1293, along with other “more 
truly” feudal families.21 
                                                 
18 It was as if merchants were infeudated, like the soldiers were. Later in the absolutist period, this logic 
develops into a “service nobility.” (Rosenberg, Mousnier) 
19 Blomquist is particularly good at demonstrating these patrilineage spillovers, for the companies and 
families of Lucca. 
20 Restricted because there were not very many large unitary merchant banks. 
21 This observation speaks to a long-standing debate in Florentine political historiography: Ottakar, etc. 
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In sum, the Dugento mechanism of organizational invention was the pope 
reaching into the Champagne fairs to extend and to absorb the international merchant-
bankers he found there. The unitary merchant-banks thereby created warrant the label 
“invention”, not just “innovation”, because of the systemic spillovers they induced, which 
reinforced the reproduction of these banks. These multiple-network systemic spillovers 
included the following: (a) the deflection of international trade from the Champagne fairs 
of the banks’ origin into themselves; (b) development of the capacity of state finance to 
anticipate slow revenues; (c) creation of the English system of customs; (d) the growth of 
the Florentine textile manufacturing industry; and (e) absorption of elite merchants into 
noble family systems of patrilineage. This autocatalytic ensemble of multiple-network 
flows made not just innovative banks, but a Commercial Revolution. 
 
4. Macro-historical survey   
Such at least is my causal interpretation, based on considerable reading.22 Now 
what about evidence and ‘proof’? In this fourth section, I provide a macro-historical 
survey of the wars and political context of the organizational development of the Tuscan 
unitary merchant-banks. I provide new evidence from the papal registers dating the main 
innovative “extension and absorption” intervention by pope Urban IV to 1262. In the next 
fifth section, using both papal registers and existing case studies, I trace the ‘dependent 
variable’ that responded to this papal intervention, as best I can with imperfect data – 
namely, growth and transformation in the partnership and branch structures of Italian 
merchant-banks. 
  
(a) Champagne fairs 
 The seed out of which the Tuscan unitary merchant-banks grew were the short-
term partnerships and agency relations among the geographically fluid Italian merchants 
who were participated in the Champagne fairs outside of Paris, and in nazioni expatriate 
communities in England, in Flanders, and in other parts of France. The first documented 
                                                 
22 I have placed on my webpage lengthy extracts from the secondary literature and from the primary source 
of published papal registers (in Latin). The interpretation offered in the previous section is my synthesis of 
these various materials. 
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“caravan merchants” to the Champagne fairs, in the 1190s, were from Arras in Flanders 
and from Asti in the Italian Alps.23 By 1253, the Genoese had moved to a position of 
dominance in this merchant trading and exchange business.24 Italian merchants moving 
within the orbits of their nazioni and home towns developed short-term agency or “power 
of attorney” relations25 with each other, in order to take care of each others’ business in 
cities while they were absent. Mostly these delegation contracts were between merchants 
from the same home town. Longer-term partnerships, to the extent they existed, were 
often between brothers. The Genoese in particular, because of their sea trade, had the 
capacity to extend these agency or procurator relations east to the Levant, as well as north 
to Champagne.26 
 The Champagne fairs sprung into existence, probably in the mid 1100s, due to the 
macroeconomic conjuncture of the development of trading routes to the Levant, the 
discovery of silver in Germany, and the emergence of textile production in Flanders. In 
its origins the Champagne fairs had nothing to do with state or papal finance.   
 
(b) Crusades 
 Local feudal fighting was of course a constant during this period. But the really 
big military actions were the Crusades. The “extension and absorption” intervention on 
which I shall focus happened when the Crusades were diverted from their usual outward 
                                                 
23 Reynolds (1930). 
24 According to Face (1969, p. 76): “Using as my criterion their appearance as principals in a contract 
drawn on a fair of Champagne in the fourth volume of the unpublished cartulary of the Genoese notary 
Bartholomeus de Fornarion for the year 1253, I have identified 278 individuals as belonging to that group 
of merchants who dominated the trade between Genoa and Champagne in the middle of the thirteenth 
century… Of these 278 individuals, 146 or approximately 52% are Genoese; 50 or approximately 12% are 
Florentines; 21 are Sienese; 7 are from Lucca; 6 are from Parma; 4 are from Pistoia; and 3 are from 
Cremona. In contrast there remain only 6 Asti men. To my knowledge there are no longer any men from 
Arras in the group.” Of course, the fact that the source for this information was a Genoese notary may 
inflate the estimated Genoese percentage somewhat. 
25 More specifically, delegation contracts of procurator, nuncio or misso. See Face (1958). [See also article 
in recalled Reg volume, once I see it.] 
26 Face (1969) provides a colorful example. 
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thrust toward Jerusalem back inward toward Italy itself – the so-called “Italian Crusades” 
of the popes against the Holy Roman Empire in 1254-1302.27  
 Financing of the First Crusade (1096-99) was a decentralized affair of the 
crusaders themselves, mostly feudal lords but also poor pilgrims, who mobilized their 
own troops and funds.28 In the Second, Third, and Fourth Crusades (1147-49, 1187-92, 
1202-04), kings started to exert more centralized control, starting in the Third Crusade 
through levying special taxes mostly on the towns and on the church properties in their 
reigns.29 The Fourth Crusade demonstrated the weakness of secular control from the 
perspective of the Church: the crusaders and their Venetian shippers struck a private deal 
to capture Constantinople instead of continuing on to conquer the Holy Land. 
 In the Fifth Crusade (1217-21), popes Innocent III and Honorius III started to 
develop the fiscal administrative machinery necessary to exercise centralized papal 
control. More-or-less standardized taxes on dispersed church properties were collected by 
appointed papal nuncios and bureaucrats, rather than by local bishops alone.30 And the 
Knights Templar, as early papal ‘bankers’,31 were used to move precious metals collected 
from local churches and monasteries all over Europe to the East, there to be distributed 
by papal legates, like Pelagius. Such centralized fiscal distribution blurred the line 
between crusaders and mercenaries. 
Many strides in papal fiscal administration thus were made, including within the 
pope’s central office or camera (literally ‘bedroom’). Without these, the later Italian 
merchant-banks would have had no one to work with. But the dramatic failure32 of the 
Seventh Crusade (1248-54), led by an alliance between Pope Innocent IV and King/Saint 
                                                 
27 The narrative in this subsection draws heavily from Grossman (1965) and from Housley (1982). [Maybe 
also Abulafia, once I get that book.]  
28 Or else scavenged them en route. 
29 The first general tax levy was called the Saladin Tithe, a precursor to national taxation. Nobles usually 
escaped these levies on the ground of direct military participation, on the ground of paying someone to take 
their place, or on the ground of simple refusal, the king not having enough power to coerce them. 
30 Lunt ( ). 
31 Bankers in quotes because only physical transport, no loans involved. 
32 Including the Muslim capture and ransom of the French king, for an amount equivalent to an entire 
year’s tax revenue in France.  
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Louis IX of France, illustrated the weakness of even this improved system: neither slowly 
assembled monies (i.e., precious metals) nor troops could be delivered in a timely and 
coordinated fashion in emergency situations. 
 
(c) Italian Crusades 
 Enter the Holy Roman Emperors – first the dashing Frederick II (1194-1250), 
then his tough sons legitimate Conrad IV (1228-54) and illegitimate Manfred (1232-66), 
then his adolescent grandson Conradin (1252-68). Through their inherited and wealthy 
base in Sicily, as well as through their disorderly homeland in Germany, all of these 
emperors aspired to making their grandiose but chimeral titles into reality. All that was 
necessary was to take over the popes’ heartland of Italy, using a military squeeze play. 
 This was not an unattainable goal because all of Italy was militarily fractious at 
the time – too busy fighting their neighbors to come together to defend ‘themselves’, 
whatever that meant.33 Upon Frederick II’s revival of the pope-versus-emperor wars,34 all 
these local feudal bands of Italian nobles/thugs clustered themselves into “Guelf” and 
“Ghibelline” factions. Technically those labels meant “pro-pope” and “pro-emperor” 
respectively, but these military bands of nobles remained concerned primarily about their 
hostile neighbors. Hence they were not always reliable to their titular ‘leaders’.35 What 
this meant for Frederick and for his opponent popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV was that 
whenever any of them blew a whistle, they could assemble a hodgepodge of 
unpredictable Italian noble militia to supplement whatever core troops they had. All this 
made for a very combustible military situation in Italy throughout the 1200s. 
Wars in Italy broke out repeatedly: between Frederick and Pope Gregory in 1237-
41, between Frederick and Pope Innocent in 1246-48, and between Manfred and Pope 
Innocent in 1254. With the Tuscan Ghibelline victory in 1260 in support of Manfred at 
Montaperti (outside of Siena), the emperors’ dream of control over Italy seemed finally 
within reach. Since 1232, the popes no longer even had a stable home in Rome: they fled 
                                                 
33 Waley (1969) is an especially good survey account of the politics and domestic warfare of the Italian 
communes during this period. Jones ( ) is more learned, but also more costive. 
34 The Investiture Controversy had been in 1075. 
35 Famous theatre line: “enter stage right, Guelfs and Ghibellines fighting.” 
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from one mountain top to another, in search of security and friends, all the while 
frantically issuing papal bulls or commands that made it seem like their bureaucracy still 
functioned.36 The popes were in very grave danger indeed, in spite of their administrative 
reforms. 
 Overall, then, the Dugento presents to modern eyes a contradiction: on the 
economic side, a budding “modernity” of trade, contracts and markets; on the military 
side, a bewildering morass of feudal fighting at multiple scales, always with armies of 
questionable loyalty. These were the raw social-network materials out of which the new 
Tuscan merchant-banks were built. 
 
(d) Pope Urban IV 
 Figure 1 presents data on the total number of papal bulls or commands issued per 
year, from 1243 to 1268, as recorded in the papal registries of four consecutive mid-
Dugento popes (citations in bibliography). Figure 2 presents data on the subset of these 
papal bulls mentioning Italian bankers.37 Figure 1 demonstrates a heavy papal workload – 
medieval popes were busy people – whose temporal rhythms were tied to their successive 
wars with the Holy Roman Emperor. Figure 2 shows that, while the first connections 
between popes and Italian bankers certainly preceded Urban IV,38 it was only under the 
reign of Urban IV that Italian bankers suddenly became actively organized into these 
strenuous war efforts. One effect of this mobilization appears to be that the efficiency of 
bull-issuing behavior by Urban IV skyrocketed to nearly 2000 in 1264, in preparation for 
his upcoming war with Manfred. Even this unprecedented effort underestimates that 
year’s amazing bull-production rate, since pope Urban died on September 11, 1264, 
thereby depriving the time series of over three months of otherwise observable 
behavior.39  
                                                 
36 Reading the bureaucratic formality of the papal registers while noticing the skittish movements of the 
popes who issued these ‘commands’ makes for a somewhat poignant experience. 
37 The complete list of these bulls, with verbatim extracts from each, is presented in a file entitled “Papal 
Registers”, publicly available on my webpage: http://home.uchicago.edu/~jpadgett. 
38 A fact to which I shall return below.  
39 Was it possible that Pope Urban IV died of overwork? 
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 What led Urban IV strenuously to mobilize Italian bankers into his war-making 
fiscal machinery? The problems that Italian merchant-bankers could solve, which the 
Knights Templar could not, have already been mentioned: (a) transfer of money using 
cambium contracts through their dispersed network of agents (rather than lugging 
precious metal around on horses), and most important of all (b) loans, using capital raised 
at the Champagne fairs. Italian bankers could solve the fiscal speed, and hence the 
military coordination, problems that plagued tax extraction at that time.  
Obviously these economic-efficiency advantages were fundamental for lock-in 
and selection. They represented a major innovation in state finance. But this statement of 
fiscal consequences is not enough to explain Urban IV’s act of innovation. Once the 
Champagne fairs developed, other popes before Urban could have done the same thing. 
Both motive and opportunity were there. But only Urban did it. Functionalist 
explanations of consequence, however helpful for understanding selection, are not causal 
explanations of genesis. 
Urban’s predecessor, pope Alexander IV, had the major strategic idea, but 
apparently was too administratively incompetent to pull it off. Namely, to preach 
“crusade” against the “Anti-Christ” in Italy. The Jerusalem experience of generalized tax 
levies on church properties (e.g., the decima) thereby came on line, and Italian Guelf 
militias were catalyzed. Some complained that this was a perversion of the crusader 
ideal.40 But for the popes of the time, this was a life-and-death matter. 
Alexander’s specific and quite plausible idea was to preach this crusade in 
England, where English king Henry III had previously expressed his interest to Innocent 
IV in commuting Henry’s earlier ‘true’ crusader pledge to a “Sicilian Venture” that 
allowed his second son Edmund to invade and to take over Sicily, instead of going off 
himself to the Holy Land. In spite of Innocent’s intense struggle with Frederick, this 
pious pope said to Henry: “No thanks, go off to the Holy Land.” Which Henry never did.  
Pope Alexander, on the other hand, even though he was no less religious41 than 
Innocent, decided to take Henry up on his offer after all. Taxes on English church 
properties were raised for the venture, but tax collection was so slow, and English 
                                                 
40 Matthew Paris. Housley. 
41 The background of Pope Alexander IV was … 
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resistance so high, that enough money never could be assembled quickly enough. The 
incomplete tax revenues ended up in who-knows-whose pockets. Eventually, this 
‘illegitimate’ tax extraction led to the Barons’ Revolt in 1258, to the military defeat of 
king Henry, and to the temporary loss of his power.42 
Pope Urban took this failed idea of Alexander and made it French. He himself 
was French in ethnicity, from Troyes in Champagne, not Italian like his predecessors. 
And his previous job had been Patriarch of Jerusalem, in which capacity he was 
intimately familiar with crusade finance. One result was that Charles of Anjou, brother of 
King/Saint Louis IX, was chosen to be the pope’s champion, instead of Edmund of 
England. “Crusade” against the Holy Roman Anti-Christ was launched using church 
properties in France as the tax base, and the Champagne fairs as liquidity. Charles of 
Anjou himself was to contribute nothing, except himself and his troops. A prince and 
future king in name, but a mercenary in fact. 
Presumably Urban became familiar with the merchant-banking techniques of the 
Genoese while in his previous job. So why then did he choose the Tuscans and not the 
Genoese to be his Italian merchant-bankers? Because his Tuscan merchant-bankers were 
politically Guelf and the Genoese were not.43 
Such was the sequence of moves, stretching over three popes, that led to Urban’s 
administrative innovation. This innovation of Tuscan merchant-bankers as papal fiscal 
agents locked in, however, because it worked decisively on the military battleground. 
Urban never lived to see the culmination of his extraordinary efforts. But unlike the war 
failures of Innocent and Alexander, the subsequent (also French) pope Clement IV and 
his champion, Charles of Anjou, won a decisive battle in 1266 at Benevento over the 
fearsome Manfred, killing him directly on the battlefield and seizing his treasure. Then 
another decisive battle over the grandson Conradin in 1268 at Tagliacozzo eliminated 
him as well. Major emergency loans by Tuscan merchant-bankers, against future tax 
collections (with a profit of course), were essential in these mercenary victories. The 
Hohenstaufen dynasty of the Holy Roman Empire thereby came to a permanent end, even 
                                                 
42 This interlude of king Henry as a figurehead only led to the establishment of Parliament. In 1265 his son 
Edward I defeated the barons and restored full monarchy. 
43 More on the intimate intertwining of Tuscan finance and Tuscan politics below. 
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though other papal wars of various sorts continued, eventually even with Charles of 
Anjou. 
As a subplot in these Italian crusades, Florence temporarily swung Ghibelline in 
1260 after Montaperti, with many Florentine Guelf noble families becoming exiles, but 
then back to Guelf in 1266 after Benevento, with many Florentine Ghibelline noble 
families exiled. Civil war raged, with much of the city and its tower-houses physically 
destroyed. Similar domestic upheaval occurred in Siena. Reverberations across levels of 
analysis are common in this period. 
 
(e) The English customs service 
 The final macro chapter in this political-economic story of banking invention is 
the creation of the English custom service, which taxed the flow of English wool to 
Flanders. This new service enabled new English king Edward I, Henry’s first son, to copy 
pope Urban IV’s fiscal innovation and to transplant it to England. Italian merchant-
bankers were to be repaid in wool, because precious metals legally could be taken out of 
the country by private citizens. 
 Curiously the diffusion of the basic idea to Edward also involved the crusades, a 
great mixer and shaker in this period. While still a prince, Edward led the failed Ninth 
‘true’ Crusade (1271-72) to the Holy Land, belatedly fulfilling his father’s pledge. During 
his slow return, he dawdled for a year in Gascony, then under his own inheritance. Luke 
Natale of Lucca, acting in the traditional role of transient banker/moneychanger for the 
crusades, traveled with Edward during his perambulations and became close friends with 
him. Luke already had been part of the networked Luchese nazione in England, out of 
which the huge Ricciardi company of Lucca was soon to spring.44 I have no ‘smoking 
gun’ quote to prove this, but I presume that Luke educated Edward about the virtues of 
Urban IV’s recent innovations. Siena and Florence, after all, were not distant from Lucca; 
and Tuscans mingled in their nazioni. For implementation in England, the only hitch was 
that there needed to be a way to repay loans by the Italian merchant-bankers (like Luke 
himself!). Since Lucca as a city was economically founded on silk manufacturing and 
trading, the solution lay close at hand. The Luchese nazione in England already moved 
                                                 
44 More details below. 
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around textiles as a business, and was quite prepared to diversify its mercantile trade 
from silk to wool. As were the Sienese and Florentine nazioni. Thus Urban IV’s 
innovation diffused to England through the self-interested intermediation of the Tuscan 
merchant-bankers themselves. They then implemented their own advice through linking 
their respective nazioni to the king’s fiscal administration. 
 The English creation of the wool customs in 1275 was an enormous step toward 
centralized monarchy. A new and centralized flow of tax revenues was made available to 
the king, independent of Magna Carta type fiscal constraints, upon which the Barons’ 
Revolt had recently insisted. The serious financial-cum-political problems that Henry the 
father had experienced were solved by Edward the son – with help from Italians, who had 
implemented an originally French idea. Patent-law assumptions notwithstanding, 
ownership of “inventions” becomes a bit distributed when systems tip. 
 Overall, my contention is that organizational invention in the ‘visible hand’ of the 
market was rooted in state finance – or more precisely, in the linkage between 
international trade and state finance.  
 
5. Organizational evolution 
 In the appendix, I present four case studies in tabular form of the organizational 
development and transactional activity of the largest banks from this period, plus one 
cross-sectional snapshot for one year, 1263, of all of the banks absolved from 
excommunication by pope Urban IV. The case studies are the Bonsignori company of 
Siena, the Scali company of Florence, the Tolomei company of Siena, and the Ricciardi 
company of Lucca. These tables array by year the data references that I have found to 
these companies in multiple secondary sources and in two primary sources: the papal 
registers of popes Innocent IV, Alexander IV, Urban IV, and Clement IV; and extracts 
from the Liberate Rolls of the king of England, assembled by Bond (1839). The case-
study tables document both the origins and the explosive growth in the 1260s of the 
Bonsignori, Scali, and Tolomei companies under the sponsorship of the popes (although 
in the Tolomei case this growth was aborted). And they document the origins and the 
explosive growth in the 1270s of the Ricciardi company under the sponsorship of king 
Edward I of England.  
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(a) Origins of case-study companies, and the failed English Sicilian venture 
 As far as my sources enable us to see them, most of the early partners in these 
four large banks were drawn from the transient Italian merchant communities or nazioni 
in Champagne and in England. They were then mobilized into cross-nazioni corporations 
by the popes, or in the Ricciardi case by the king. 
 The largest early Tuscan bank was the Bonsignori company of Siena. One is 
tempted to say that numerous famous later Florentine banks (e.g., Frescobaldi, Bardi, 
Peruzzi) were modeled on this early template, except for the fact that many such banks 
were born almost at the same time.45 The Bonsignori were the largest, the most favored, 
and the most successful of the first generation unitary banks, not literally the first one. 
 The brothers Bonifacio di Bonsignore and Orlando di Bonsignore46 were bankers 
(campsores) who operated in Genoa and Champagne.47 In 1252 Bonifacio first appears to 
have been appointed official banker to the pope (campsor domini papae).48 Bonifacio’s 
loans to the Church were not corporate in character, by which I mean that they were 
offered by temporary syndicates of merchants, who reshuffled across transactions 
through time. 
In 1255 or 1256, however, this “di Bonsignore” partnership of brothers was 
reorganized – throwing out leader Bonifacio and incorporating outsiders instead, the most 
important of which was Bonaventura di Bernardino. The apparent reason for this 
becomes clearer through the English Liberate Rolls. Bonaventura’s father, Bernardino di 
Prosperino, had been active in loaning money to the king of England, for expenses and 
the like, along with other Sienese resident in England. These loans were also not really 
                                                 
45 See the 1263 cross-section table in the appendix for a quasi “census”. 
46 “di” in this context means “son of.” Such a name (“John son of Paul”), with no surname, connotes a non-
patrician status. Indeed the relative lack of wealth of the early Bonsignori was verified by Chiaudano (   ), 
using early Sienese tax censuses. 
47 Chiaudano on Genoa 
48 English (1988, p. 12, footnote 8) thinks that Bonifacio’s appointment by Innocent IV was due to his past 
link to the previous campsor domini papae of pope Gregory IX, Angelerio Solaficu from Siena. This is 
quite plausible, but I could not verify that in the sources cited by English, and hence do not record 
Angelerio in the Bonsignori table. 
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corporate in character, but were offered by syndicates of nazione merchants, who 
reshuffled among themselves.49 The new non-family partnership between Orlando di 
Bonsignore and Bonaventura di Bernardino (and others), in other words, was a 
partnership connection between Champagne and England. We shall see similar cross-
geographical links develop at the same time in the Scali company. 
 Why the timing of this? This is the period of the failed English Sicilian venture. 
Pope Alexander IV gave to king Henry III of England permission to label as a “crusade” 
Henry’s desire to send his second son Edmund to invade Sicily, thereby attacking the 
Holy Roman Emperor. Alexander authorized the collection of crusade tithes on English 
church property. As discussed above, ultimately this failed, leading to the Baron’s Revolt 
in England. The point here is that this first triggering of the sedentary Bonsignori 
‘corporation’ was due to Alexander’s early drive toward Italian-crusade papal finance.  
 In addition to internal English political constraints, a second reason for the failure 
of this particular war mobilization effort was the personal passivity of Alexander in 
directing this tax-collection effort (as indicated in figure 1). Alexander delegated the 
collection of taxes on English church property to his hated50 legate, xxx. In sharp 
contrast, pope Urban IV directed his own frantic tax-collection drive himself, sending out 
orders all over France and Italy, but mainly France, in a much more centralized style. 
 While the details of the early formation of the Scali company are of course 
different, the broad contour is similar. The core of the Scali company was not really the 
della Scala family at all. Rather it was a clique of four Florentine merchants resident in 
England – Amieri Cosa, Spigliato di Cambio, Rocco di Cambio, and Mainetto Spini. 
These merchants had imported cloth into England since 1229, since the beginning of 
Italian nazioni communities in England. These merchants also offered a variety of loans 
                                                 
49 Indeed the appendix shows that temporary syndicate partners in England of Bernardino di Prosperi later 
became regular partners in the Scali and Tolomei companies.  
50 The chronicle of Matthew Paris (1986, p. 275) provides insight into contemporary English toward this 
tax collection and towards Italian bankers in general: “The usurers called Chorsins, who went under the 
name Christians, found a place of refuge and peace in England. First tolerated, and then afterwards openly 
protected by the pope, the unblushingly called themselves merchants or money-changers of the pope. 
Prelates were suspended from the collation to benefices until the pope’s avarice on behalf of his unworthy 
barbarians [i.e., mercenaries], who never appeared in England.”  
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to the king from 1245 to 1254, in the reshuffling syndicate manner typical of the time – 
one deal of which involved Jacobo della Scala.51  
 The alliance between this clique and the della Scala family took place in 1255 
through 1257. In 1255, a large loan was given in Gascony to king Henry III’s first son 
prince Edward (later to be king Edward I), in order to raise some troops.52 In 1256, a 
substantial partnership in England crystallized to service the Sicilian venture. In 1257, 
Jacobo’s son Cavalcante joined this new company on a permanent basis, thereby 
contributing the company’s name.53  
Syndicate loans directly to the English crown continued in 1258 and 1259, but in 
1261 we see the massive entry of a greatly enlarged ‘Scali’ company into the pope’s own 
service. This was the year that the Scali company was appointed campsores domini 
papae, joining the Bonsignori company in this role.54 The appointment of this second 
“favored banking company” was made by pope Alexander IV at the very end of his life, 
probably in order to strengthen his (failed) financial connection to England. The 
Bonsignori had restructured themselves to strengthen their own English connection, but 
their economic roots remained primarily in France. The “Scali” however had been in 
England from the Italian nazioni beginning. 
The Tolomei company comes closest to fitting the Sapori model of “family plus 
outsiders,” because of the extensive involvement of the patrician Tolomei family, mostly 
in small loans to the city government. But even these various Tolomei family members 
combined and recombined in their transactions in a fluid manner.  
The Tolomei case is complicated, however, by the fact that when the pope first 
mobilized them into papal finance, during the failed Sicilian venture, he actually 
mobilized two companies of them. The first was the earlier family-dominated business. 
                                                 
51 The family surname “della Scala” indicates a higher social status than the others. 
52 Borsari (1994), p. 19. 
53 I speculate that the Scali name was chosen for the firm, in spite of leadership by others, was the superior 
social status of that name. Another, not really competing, hypothesis is the greater capital contribution of 
della Scala. No founding contracts, which would list startup capital contributions, of any of these 
companies survives. Later the less prestigious Cambii family spun out of the Scali company to form their 
own company. When they did so they took on a new more noble family name for themselves: the de Mozzi.   
54 Jordan, p. 11. 
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This set of partners moved for a few years into papal finance, but then dropped out and 
went back to wool trading. The second apparently new company, the Scotti-Tolomei 
company, was an alliance between three of the Tolomei with numerous other Sienese, 
including four of the Scotti. This second company was appointed official campsores 
domini papae by Alexander late in his life. This second company also did not stay long in 
papal finance. Urban launched an investigation into its financial performance, which 
apparently was not satisfactory.55 The first Tolomei was called in to broker a compromise 
between pope Urban and the Scotti-Tolomei. While the first Tolomei company escaped 
blame in the matter, neither company figured as major papal bankers again. 
I do not have much partnership data over time on the Scotti-Tolomei. But the fact 
that the regular Tolomei, when they dropped back to normal wool merchants, also 
dropped back to shifting partnership patterns, is the exception that proves the rule. 
 My fourth and final case study of the Ricciardi company shows how the popes’ 
financial innovation worked when it was transposed ten years later to England by the 
finally new56 king Edward I. King Edward made an important extension to this state-
finance system of enormous consequence for the wool industry in Florence: the 
introduction of a wool customs, to pay back Tuscan bankers’ loans to the English king.  
 The first page of the Ricciardi table in the appendix, which takes us through 1266, 
demonstrates that originally there were two almost completely distinct sets of Lucchese 
merchants, who later combined into the unified Ricciardi company: one set operating in 
Lucca, the other set operating in England. The Lucchese merchants in Lucca were 
manufacturing fine silk cloth The Lucchese merchants in England were selling that silk 
cloth to wealthy clients, including to king Henry III himself. The “Ricciardi” name 
descended from Lucca half of this cooperation – in particular, from one Ricciardo di 
Graziano di Ricciardo, a silk dyer or tintor. Each of these two geographically distinct 
subsets of merchants demonstrated considerable fluidity in their partnerships – namely, 
partnerships formed and re-formed among merchants within these two locations over 
time. The “almost” part of the first sentence in this paragraph refers to the one exception 
of Peregrino Sesmundi, who in 1241 apparently moved from Lucca to England, thereby 
                                                 
55 Bull #. Marucc.  
56 King Henry III’s reign lasted 56 years. King Edward I’s own reign will last 35 years. 
 24
creating the only partnership “bridge” in these early data between these two subsets of 
merchants.  
 Based on these data, previous historians have assumed that an integrated Ricciardi 
company existed in the 1240s and 1250s, with one branch making silk and the other 
branch selling silk. In my opinion, this reads history backward: inferring early structure 
from what followed. No doubt there were cooperative exchange relations existing 
between these two complementary halves of the supply chain. But I don’t see the 
historical data, such as it is,57 as demonstrating anything more than regularized 
cooperation. 
 The Ricciardi company exploded in partnership size, however, in the 1270s, with 
geographical branches appearing not only in England, but also in Ireland and Paris. The 
original Lucca silk-manufacturing branch recedes from sight in the sources, but an 
extensive partnership list in 1286 leads to the presumption that the silk-manufacturing 
‘home office’ was still there, in the misty background. The Lucca branch itself was 
overshadowed by the transformation of the Ricciardi company into the primary bankers 
of the English king. As a consequence, the most important partner of the company was no 
longer one of the Ricciardi family, but rather Lucasio Natale (Luke of Luka in English 
sources), the personal banker and friend of king Edward I. 
 Judging from timing, the triggering event in this transformation of the Ricciardi 
company appears to be loans58 given to the still prince Edward in Genoa in 1272 during 
his leisurely return to England from his failed Ninth Crusade. Lucasio Natale had 
accompanied Edward throughout his crusade, such travels building upon the earlier social 
and business ties established between his compatriots and king Henry III, in their roles as 
personalized silk salesmen.59 It seems plausible to assume from their speed of 
                                                 
57 To repeat footnote xx, no founding contract of any partnership has survived from this period, so this 
disagreement in interpretation of the data is not capable of definitive resolution. 
58 Kaueper (1973), p. 81; Del Punto (2004), p. 163. Earlier in 1255, Edward had received large loans in 
Gascony from the Scali, so he was directly familiar with Tuscan bankers. That previous event had 
triggering consequences for the Scali company as well. 
59 As is well known, by Weber among others, state financial administration and the ‘king’s wardrobe’ 
blended in medieval government. Indeed the literal translation of the papal camera is the pope’s ‘bedroom’. 
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implementation, immediately after Edward’s November 1272 accession to the throne, 
that the financial innovations by Edward – namely, to appoint the Ricciardi company as 
favored state financiers, and to make wool customs the mechanism of repayment – was 
rooted in these travel conversations and these loans between Lucasio and prince Edward. 
Through nazioni linkages with other Tuscan bankers abroad, Lucasio would have been 
well informed about the contemporary financial innovations made by his Sienese and 
Florentine colleagues. If this speculation is correct, then Tuscan bankers were not only 
the beneficiaries but also the (self-interested) authors of innovation in English state 
finance, at least in part. 
 Tuscan bankers in general, and the Ricciardi company in particular, benefited 
greatly in trade from their increased control over the flow of English wool exports in 
repayment for their loans to the English king. In 1273, 24.4% of all licensed wool exports 
from England were in the hands of Tuscan companies. The distribution of wool export 
trade in that year was as follows:60    
  Scotti of Piacenza  2140 sacks 
  Riccardi of Lucca  1080 sacks 
  Frescobaldi of Florence 880 sacks 
  Bardi of Florence  700 sacks 
  Nicholas Testa of Lucca 700 sacks 
Macci of Florence  640 sacks 
  Falconieri of Florence  620 sacks 
  Cerchi of Florence  400 sacks 
 
Twenty years later in 1294, a crisis year, the wool exports in the hands of Tuscan 
companies that were seized by the king were as follows:61  
  Riccardi of Lucca  412 sacks 
  Frescobaldi of Florence 360 sacks 
Cerchi Neri of Florence 350 sacks 
  Cerchi Bianchi of Florence 301 sacks 
  Mozzi of Florence  261 sacks 
Pulci of Florence  257.5 sacks 
Frescobaldi Neri of Florence 154 sacks 
                                                                                                                                                 
Orlando Bonsignori, pope Innocent IV’s favorite banker, slept in the pope’s bedroom, though not I assume 
in the pope’s bed.   
60 Schaube (1908), p. 68, 183; reproduced in Kaeuper (1994), pp. 43-44. 
61 Kaeuper (1994), p. 44. 
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Spini of Florence  153.5 sacks 
Bardi of Florence    99 sacks 
  Bettori of Lucca    35 sacks. 
 
These English wool-export lists give a hint of the growth in numbers of Tuscan 
unitary merchant-banks during the second half of the Dugento, after the initiating events 
analyzed here.62 
 
(b) Pope Urban IV and the corporate organizational form 
Before he was elected pope in 1261, Urban IV was Jacques Pantaléon of Troyes. 
Troyes was the largest of the four towns that comprised the Champagne fairs. Urban IV, 
in other words, was from the Champagne fairs. Speaking a bit metaphorically Urban IV 
was himself the incorporation of the fairs into the papacy. Speaking less metaphorically, 
he knew how they worked. This knowledge was used and polished by his appointment in 
1255 as Patriarch of Jerusalem, shortly after the disaster of the failed Seventh crusade.63 
Rather than being an insular man of Rome,64 Urban IV was a man comfortable in the 
extended trading and military networks of medieval Europe. 
In figure 1, we have already seen evidence of Urban IV’s capacity for hard work. 
Most of this work involved the financing of Charles of Anjou’s army for war against 
Manfred. Urban IV did not delegate like Alexander IV; he took charge personally. 
Looking a bit more into the details of figure 2 reveals an interesting wrinkle in Urban’s 
mobilization of Italian bankers. At first, pope Urban IV relied heavily on the Bonsignori 
company, which he had inherited from his predecessors. The switch from projected 
English troops to projected French troops, after all, actually played to Bonsignori 
strengths. In 1264 at the very peak of Urban IV’s frenzy, however, he dropped the 
Bonsignori company entirely, relying instead on a diversified range of other banks. One 
long-term consequence of this shift in centralized papal strategy was to propel the 
                                                 
62 A longer list of sixteen Tuscan firms active in England, from 1283, is provided in Lunt (1939), appendix 
VI, pp. 641-665. Blomquist (1971), pp. 173-178, provides a valuable comprehensive list of export-oriented 
companies in Lucca in 1284, which includes more than companies involved in English trade. 
63 This was the crusade where the army of King/Saint Louis IX was defeated in Egypt. He was captured and 
ransomed for about one year’s revenues of the entire kingdom of France. 
64 Indeed as I mentioned above, he was too much on the run ever to reside in Rome. 
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diffusion of the corporate organizational form beyond a few papal favorites out into the 
market at large.  
What lay behind Urban’s sudden shift towards diversification? I suggest that 
Urban IV’s tactical approach in 1264 was not inconsistent with the Champagne fair 
experience of Jacques Pantaléon – except that the companies involved now emerged at a 
vastly larger scale and scope than before, with permanent branches instead of fluid 
partnerships. Urban IV from Champagne was using the market logic of Champagne to 
mobilize for war.65 
Reasonable as this is as a cognitively predisposing factor, Edward English has 
discovered that Urban had more on his mind than efficient market logic when he chose 
his bankers. The Guelfs and the Ghibellines of Siena and Florence had just had their 
battle of Montaperti in 1260, resulting in Ghibelline victory and in the installation of pro-
Emperor regimes in both Siena and Florence. This was the battle that led to the nadir of 
the popes’ fortunes in Italy. Urban was basically surrounded by his enemies. His strategy 
for counter-attack was to excommunicate both cities,66 but also to target with absolution 
particular lists of Guelf allies and potential allies. Foremost among these absolution lists 
were companies of merchants and companies of soldiers.67 These lists are the source of 
the 1263 quasi-census of internationally oriented Florentine and Sienese companies 
presented in the appendix. It is worth noting that most of the new companies in this 1263 
list are Florentine, not Sienese. Not all of the companies absolved in 1263 were 
ultimately used for papal finance in 1264 (at least in the data I coded), but many of them 
were. This may be the first intimation of a gradual takeover of papal business by the 
Florentines. If so, it places the politics of Guelf versus Ghibelline at the center of the 
explanation of the economic victory of Florence over Siena in the late Dugento.68 
                                                 
65 Padgett and McLean (2006) call such examples of “old tool for new purpose” as the organizational- 
invention mechanism of “transposition and refunctionality.” Lewontin and Gould ( ) called it “exaptation.” 
Padgett and Ansell (1993) argued that Cosimo de’ Medici did something similar.  
66 Bull #: 
67 For merchant companies, bull #s:… For soldier companies, bull #: 
68 But I do not deny the also crucial importance of the developing Florentine wool industry in this economic 
victory. (Goldthwaite’s new book) 
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There was a political logic involved in the diversification of banks, in other 
words, as well as a market logic. Not only the original Bonsignori and Scali companies 
but also most of the Guelf-inclined international bankers in Siena and Florence were 
mobilized into Urban’s ‘crusade’ against Manfred. This in opposition to the regimes of 
their own cities.69 Papal oil was thrown on the fires of Tuscan civil wars. When Charles 
of Anjou finally defeated Manfred in 1266, previously exiled Sienese and Florentine 
Guelfs triumphantly returned to their cities, exiled ruling Ghibellines in their turn, and 
destroyed their tower-houses. Powerful noble Ghibelline families70 fled to the hills and to 
friendlier cities, bitterly plotting their revenge and giving Dante much to write about. 
The aspect of this story that interests us here is the organizational consequence of 
this successful mobilization, both political and economic, of Tuscan bankers for Italian 
crusade. Corporate organizational form, in the medieval sense of that term, is evident in 
the four case-study tables in the appendix in the following ways:   
1. Branches are indicated by the geographical clustering of different non-director 
partners (soci in the documents) into specialized transaction locations.71 
2. In contrast, director-partners are characterized by geographical diversity, as 
they write ‘home office’ letters to their branches. 
3. Director-partner roles and non-director-partner roles are distinguished 
linguistically in the papal-bull documents.72  In the appendix this linguistic 
                                                 
69 This contested civil-war context led sometimes to strange contradiction. Orlando Bonsignori, for 
example, the ‘lead’ partner of the Bonsignori banking company of the pope, actually aligned himself with 
the Ghibelline regime of Siena. So much so, that he fought in the Sienese Ghibelline army at Montaperti 
against his papal employer’s allies the Guelfs. This is someone who chose city or company, suffering exile 
as a consequence. Needless to say, Orlando laid low in the papal registers after this political choice, with 
Bonaventura emerging instead as the economic leader. But Orlando still functioned officially as one of the 
four directors of the firm. Pope Urban IV’s effort to splinter the politics of Tuscan cities, in other words, 
sometimes splintered the politics of his companies instead. Perhaps this was one triggering stimulus that led 
Urban to drop the Bonsignori in 1264 as primary bankers.   
70 Listed in Libro di Montaperti. 
71 This criterion alone is not decisive, because it could also indicate only nazioni, as mentioned above. 
Indeed members of branch offices of unitary firms were still members of nazioni, just like their more fluid 
colleagues. But this criterion does rule out “caravan merchants” (Reynolds). 
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differentiation of roles is indicated by underlining the bull number in which 
such language appears. [give actual language and first dates for my cases] 
4. Soon after the 1260s the highly corporate language of “societas” or society – 
as in “Societas Ricciardorum” – will appear in documents, to refer to unitary 
companies of merchant-bankers.73 In the origin period of the 1260s examined 
here, that word had not yet become routinized in the papal bulls.74 Criterion 
#3 language was more commonly used instead. Lack of standardization in 
language is yet another indicator of the new nature of this organizational form. 
 
I have demonstrated a very close temporal connection between the emergence of 
the corporate organizational form in Tuscan banking and financial mobilization by the 
popes in their Italian crusades against the Holy Roman Emperors. It seems clear that 
finance for the ‘state’ became linked to the ‘market’ of the Champagne fairs. For where, 
after all, did the Tuscan bankers get their monies for loans to the pope, and later the 
English king, in the first place? From the fairs.    
 I want to close this section by speculating about why the corporate organizational 
form in particular? Different aspects of this form were connected to different aspects of 
bankers’ connection with the pope. “Large” seems induced by the magnitude of the 
extraordinary crusade taxes on Church properties, under the constraint that only a few 
favored banks were selected for the job. “Geographically dispersed” seems induced by 
the geographical dispersion of those Church assets. Loan money could be raised centrally 
in Champagne, but repayment was scattered all over Europe. These two demographic 
aspects lead us toward, but not quite all the way to the concept of “corporate.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
72 An example would be “Andree Jacobi, Facio Juncte et Bonsignori Raynerii, sociis delectorum filiorum 
Rolandi Bonsignoris, Bonaventura Bernardini et Raynerii Jacobi, civium et mercatorum Senensium, 
campsorum camere nostre...”  (Registres d’Urbain IV, 2, n. 9.) Here Andrea di Jacopo, Facio di Giunte and 
Bonsignore di Raineri were carrying out in France a financial order issued by Urban IV, in the name of 
their company directors Orlandino di Bonsignore, Bonaventura di Bernardino and Raineri di Jacopo. 
73 This contrasts with the prior, and possibly more fluid, language of soci or partners. 
74 Exceptions where this language does appear are … 
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 Corporate in the medieval sense meant body, in particular collective body, as in 
“body of Christ.”75 This in turn meant the continuity of the organization beyond the 
participatory contributions of its members – as in procession, hopefully all the way to 
heaven.76 In the less rarified terms of practical economics, Catholic ‘corporate body’ 
implied two things: (a) the recruitment by partners of sons and kinsmen to carry on the 
company after they died, and (b) the joint liability by all in the societas to debts incurred 
by any of the partners.77 In the next section, I see if the data fits the first of these 
implications. There I develop my hypothesis about “family out of company,” rather than 
“company out of family.” 
 The one final, and perhaps most crucial, feature of the Dugento Tuscan 
organizational form was “sedentary merchants doing written business through letters.” 
Where might Tuscan bankers have gotten this idea? To whose letters are they 
responding? What is my papal register data, after all? Even though I have never seen this 
suggestion in the literature, it does not seem so outlandish to suggest that Tuscan unitary 
bankers absorbed a secular version of church organization into themselves when they 
became agents of, indeed when they became part of, the papal camera. They began to 
write business letters to their branch offices, just like the pope wrote letters to his 
geographically dispersed agents, which now included them.  
Medieval ‘agency’ in part was incorporation. Papal bulls from the pope to 
Bonaventura Bernardini and Francesco Guidi, ‘agents’ of the Bonsignori company 
‘assigned’ to the pope,78 read like virtual letters of endearment.79 “My dearest son” 
language is everywhere, formalized but also apparently sincere. The arms-length and 
modernist language of ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ hardly seems capable of capturing the 
interactional meaning of medieval ‘business’ relations.80 
                                                 
75 Cf. Kantorowicz. 
76 Duby talks about church life in general and the crusades in particular as procession.  
77 Sapori on unlimited liability to third parties. 
78 Or were they ‘agents’ of the pope, ‘assigned’ to the Bonsignori company? 
79 [examples] 
80 Paul’s book. 
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 The “origin of banking” framing of most economic historiography on unitary 
merchant-banks is modernist in that it looks to explain economic consequences by 
economic causes. I too am interested in explaining organizational genesis. But I insist 
that the social contexts of inventions be taken seriously, for these are the raw materials 
being recombined into invention. Multi-functionality and spillover are rife in social 
invention processes, in part because of objective turmoil, but also in part because other 
times and places may not parse “the economic,” “the political,” and “the social” as we do. 
Scientific explanation requires historical sensitivity.81 
 
6. Family out of company 
 Church documents in the 1200s were in Latin. Hence second names ending in “i” 
usually implied the ablative “of” – for example, “Franciscus Guidi” meant “Francis son 
of Guido.” Because of this medieval method of naming, kinship relations can be inferred 
from names. With two names strung together to make a person, one can infer the nuclear-
family kinship relations of brother and father,82 but not that of cousin. With three names 
strung together in ablative form, first cousins can be identified. As ablatives evolved into 
surnames,83 more distant ‘clan’ relations can be inferred from common surname. 
Patricians or nobles in the Dugento often added a “de” to their last names. Hence both 
kinship and social status can be inferred directly from names – a fact of course that was 
no accident to the people involved. 
 According to the documents that I saw, when Sapori referred to the first stage of 
unitary company development being “family”, he must have been referring to nuclear 
family. Non-noble persons, with only ablative names, overwhelmingly predominated in 
the Dugento partnership lists, even though noble family names do occasionally appear. 
                                                 
81 It would take me too far afield to develop this point, but I am arguing here for a processual or 
‘mechanism’ view of science (Elster), rather than an input-output ‘covering law’ view of science. This 
processual view makes much of the usually assumed contradiction between history and science go away. 
82 Although not without some chance of error in those cases where two unrelated persons had fathers with 
the same firs name.  
83 Three names strung together implies self-consciousness of lineage, at least at the common grandfather 
level. As such self-consciousness of lineage develops, grandchildren and beyond can turn their ablative 
ancestor name “of Guido” into a new surname for themselves of “Guidi”. See Padgett 2009. 
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Interestingly, however, the overall company name, once it developed, frequently referred 
to the noble member of the partnership, even though that member may not have been the 
true economic leader.84 An example discussed above is the Scali company – named after 
Jacobus de Scala, even though that company was founded and led primarily by a clique 
of four non-patrician merchants in the Florentine nazione in England. Using the family 
name of the company to infer the “family foundation” of the company, therefore, can be a 
surprisingly precarious enterprise, at least for the mid-Dugento. 
 In this section I shall measure kinship connections among partners directly. I shall 
find that Blomquist’s consorteria hypothesis fits the cross-sectional partnership data of 
the mid-Dugento better than does Sapori’s more famous “core family plus outsiders” 
hypothesis. Viewed over time, Sapori’s “company out of family” portrait makes sense as 
long as the word “family” is constrained to non-noble nuclear families. This caveat is not 
commonly observed in the literature, wherein the family name of the company is usually 
what is referenced. When the word “family” means patrilineage, I find that the image of 
“family out of company” fits the data better, with merchant nuclear families growing into 
patrician patrilineages if the unitary company succeeded. 
 Summary statistics about kinship relations among the partners of the companies 
whose excommunication pope Urban IV had absolved in 1263-64, and pope Clement IV 
absolved in 1265, are as follows:85 
proportion partners in largest-family (nuclear or otherwise) subset of partners 
  = (Σi # largest family subseti) / (Σi # partnersi) 
  = 71 / 197 = .360 
 proportion partners in any-family (nuclear or otherwise) subset of partners 
  = (Σi # partners with any kin as partnersi) / (Σi # partnersi)  
  = 124 / 197 = .629. 
                                                 
84 “Leader” in this sentence is defined in terms of the transactional behavior documented in the appendix. 
As I have said numerous times, no partnership contracts survive from this period; these would have listed 
the startup-capital investment of the various partners. It is possible, indeed likely, that noble families 
contributed more than their fair share of the corpo, even if they were passive investors. 
85 Readers are free of course to look in the appendix at the particular companies comprising these aggregate 
statistics. I included all absolved companies, including the Bonsignori, Scali and Tolomei, in the statistics. 
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Small companies with four or fewer partners do not really fit my unitary-bank definition. 
If these are excluded, then the kinship proportions shrink to .297 and .600,86 respectively.  
The connection between kinship and unitary merchant-banks therefore was high. 
But this connection was not just a single family per company. Within these companies 
there were about as many partners in kinship relations outside of the largest kin group as 
there were partners within the largest kinship group. If Dugento companies are to be 
described as “family plus outsiders,” then it must be understood that “outsiders” had 
many family relations among themselves. Indeed simple inspection of the lists shows that 
Dugento unitary companies were alliances of families – not alliances of noble patrilineal 
families, like the military tower societies,87 but alliances of merchant nuclear families. 
Blomquist has noticed this already, with regard to the Ricciardi company: 
“Despite its legal status as a simple partnership, the Ricciardi enterprise appears 
to have been similar functionally to the consortial organizations into which the 
families of the Lucchese urban elite commonly banded together. I am suggesting 
here that the large-scale international societas differed from a consortium (in 
Lucca called consortatus) only in that its purpose was to engage in commerce and 
finance rather than to provide political and [military] refuge for its members.” 
(1980, p. 18) 
One further documentary example confirms directly this Dugento parallel 
between societas and consorteria. The absolution for the (regular) Tolomei company of 
Siena appeared in a long list88 of other Sienese “companies”, most of whom were 
composed of socii nobilium – a term that did not appear otherwise in my extract of papal 
bulls about Italian merchant-banks. Comparison with another bull89 to the exiled Guelf 
militia of Siena in 1263 confirms the impression that the first list was a list of soldier 
companies, not of merchant companies. The Tolomei company was apparently both a 
                                                 
86 The exact ratios are (52 / 175), and (105 / 175). 
87 Santini (1887); Waley (1969), p.  
88 Registre d’Urbain IV, 2, n. 175 (5 January 1263). 
89 Registre d’Urbain IV, 2, n. 274 (6 March 1263). 
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merchant company and a soldier company at the same time,90 probably because the 
family in question was noble.  
Medieval Italian documents from the 1200s refer to societas militum,91 which 
were noble families or alliances of noble families organized into cavalry bands.  
City militias were alliances of such bands.92 The Tuscan civil wars of the 1260s between 
Guelfs and Ghibellines were carried out by societates of noble soldiers from Florence and 
Siena. The Tuscan financial mobilization of the 1260s by Urban IV, as we have seen, was 
carried out by societates of mostly non-noble merchants from Florence and Siena. 
Urban’s purpose in absolving the merchant companies from his excommunication of their 
fellow citizens was to mobilize them93 for war – specifically for his ‘religious’ crusade 
against Manfred – which he successfully did. This intertwining of military with economic 
with religious organization, all in the name of crusade, can’t get much more intimate than 
this. With crusade the pope spanned deep social-class divisions within Tuscan cities,94 
and united pro-pope but fractious social segments in Florence, Siena and Lucca into 
“Guelf.”  
In their genesis, unitary merchant-banking companies in Tuscany were thus the 
economic wing of a holy army that the pope built for his Italian crusade. Diversification 
of one favored merchant company into a state-finance “market” paralleled the assembly 
of noble military companies into a feudal militia. The family-alliance or consorteria 
                                                 
90 [confirmation in Mucciarelli?] [also mention Katalin’s point about Scolari] 
91 Waley (1969), pp. 166, 183.  
 
92 Waley (1969, p. 83): “Joint inheritance might cause the obligation to fall on a number of co-heirs, 
particularly at a time when there had been no recent review of cavalry service: those owing it would then 
have to provide a cavalryman between them. This must considerably have complicated the task of 
organizing the militia, for nearly two-thirds of the Florentine horses recorded in the Libro di Montaperti 
(1260) were owed jointly by consortes.” Waley (1969, p. 135): “The approximate numbers of Florentine 
cavalrymen engaged in the four great battles of 1260 to 1325 are as follows: 1260 (Montaperti) 1,400.” 
93 “Them” here meaning both noble soldiers and non-noble merchants. 
94 I have not the space to go deeply into these social-class cleavages, but they were deep. In 1250, for 
example, the Florentine non-noble Popolo rose up militarily, on their organizational foundation of guilds, 
to make a ten-year interlude of republican government. This lasted until the Ghibelline victory at the battle 
of Montaperti in 1260.  
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nature of the internal partnership structure of unitary banks in part reflected these 
militaristic origins. 
 “Corporate” in the medieval sense implied collective continuity through time. 
One hypothesized implication for economic organization is that partners of corporate 
companies should recruit their sons to replace them, to carry on their successful business 
after they died. To test this hypothesis, one needs lists of partners over generational time. 
In my 1260s case, this means lists of the partners into at least the 1280s. With only three 
case studies that do this, my conclusions about this hypothesis can only be suggestive. 
Nonetheless, for what they are worth: (1) five of the twenty-three partners in the 
Bonsignori company of 1289 were descendants of Bonsignori company partners in the 
previous generation;95 (2) eight of the sixteen partners of the Scali company of 1282 and 
1284 were descendants of Scali company partners in the previous generation;96 (3) five of 
the seventeen partners of the Ricciardi company of 1286 were descendants of Ricciardi 
partners in the previous generation.97 Are these numbers high? I have no baseline model 
against which to evaluate statistically these numbers. But they at least are consistent with 
the “sons replace fathers” continuity hypothesis. As telling as anything is the obvious fact 
that these three companies (and quite a few others) reproduced their organizational 
survival over decades in the first place. The fluid partnerships and syndicates of the 
Italian merchants in overseas nazioni before the 1260s did not do this. The ‘Scali’ as a 
company, for example, survived over generations; and the partners comprising it 
biologically reproduced as partners as well. In the future, I hope to continue my coding of 
the Papal Registers, in order to increase the number of merchant-banks with which to 
evaluate further this hypothesis. 
 Blomquist provides evidence about a yet third kinship aspect of ‘corporate’ on 
which I have no data. In my relational dataset on Trecento and Quattrocento Florence, I 
have rich quantitative information on the marriage, economic and political networks of 
Florentines.98 I have no such network-contextual information on Dugento Florence. But 
                                                 
95 Four were the same people, and hence should not count in the denominator. 
96 One was the same person, and hence should not count in the denominator. 
97 Six were the same people, and hence should not count in the denominator. 
98 [cite my past work] 
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in his archivally rich case study99 of the Ricciardi and the Guidiccioni families of Lucca, 
who allied to make the Ricciardi company, Blomquist unearthed considerable 
information about the marriages, property purchases, and neighbors of members of these 
two families. Those data demonstrate something that I cannot – namely, that many of 
even the “non-kinship outsiders” partners in the company were linked to the dominant 
two families by marriage or by other means.  
“The evidence at hand seems sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the 
Ricciardi Company was in fact a long term alliance for commercial ends between 
families descending from the early partners in the enterprise, an alliance that was 
augmented by recruiting new members from other families which were through 
blood, marriage, consortial or neighborhood ties already linked to the group. I 
would assume that admission to partnership status of an individual lacking these 
ties must have been rare.” (1980, p. 18)  
Much of the analysis in this section extends and confirms this superb but unfortunately 
obscure case study by Blomquist. 
 All these pieces about kinship add up to my section conclusion: Successful 
leadership of unitary merchant-banks transformed merchant nuclear families into noble 
patrilineages. That is, “family out of company.” This unitary-bank channel of social 
mobility was very restricted compared to the republican channels of the Renaissance.100 
But the consequence when it happened was the same: the diffusion of corporate versions 
of “the family”, from the nobility down to mimicking merchants, in the form of 
patrilineage. Again, Blomquist’s rich case-study of the Ricciardi and the Guidiccioni of 
Lucca provides details that my study cannot – namely, the purchase and construction of 
large blocks of real estate, both in the heart of the city (tower houses) and in those areas 
of the countryside or contado from which the family had immigrated. Profits from the 
bank provided the money for these real estate purchases. But other Florentine banking 
families apparently made the same social-mobility journey – namely, descendents of 
Spigliatus and Rustichellus Cambii turned into the Mozzi, descendents of Manetto Spine 
turned into the Spini, descendents of Bonaguide Bardi turned into the Bardi, descendents 
                                                 
99 Blomquist (1980, 1982). 
100 Cf. Padgett (1980). 
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of Circulus Oliverii Circuli turned into the Cerchi, and descendents of Lambertus 
Fruscobaldi turned into the Frescobaldi. These family names are prominent as companies 
in the English wool-export lists reported above. But they are also prominent on the 1293 
list of Florentine magnates declared to be legally excluded from ever holding public 
office in the future.101 This magnate category was created by a ‘populist’ revolt against 
patricians.102 How quickly successful unitary-bank families of the 1260s took on a noble 
behavior that made them hated in populist eyes!103  
 To close this section, I want to emphasize the common consortial logic of many 
forms of Dugento social organization – in the domain of economics, in the domain of 
military, in the domain of real estate, and in the domain of family. To try too hard to 
distinguish whether a family name referred to a patrilineage or to a unitary company 
ignores the consortial logic of both. Family was property, at least in the patrilineage sense 
of family. And property was family, at least in the patrimony sense of corpo. We are very 
far away from kinship concepts like romance. 
“Transpositions and refunctionalities”104 and “extensions and absorptions” were 
everywhere in the organizations of the 1200s. This is a social-science way of saying that 
the linked concepts of societas and consorteria105 were plastic social-organizational tools 
of the Dugento, capable of mobilization for a variety of purposes. All sorts of micro-
motivations underlay the construction of particular such organizations – profit, war, 
social mobility. But both actively and passively, the Church stood behind them all, 
                                                 
101 Lansing. 
102 ‘Populist’ is in quotes because many of the revolters were patricians themselves, in alliance with 
middle-class guilds. 
103 This point about nobility through unitary banks helps to make sense of a puzzle in the political history of 
Florence – how merchants could have gotten onto a list of feudal magnates, in the eyes of contemporary 
popolani. (Ottakar debate) 
104 Padgett and McLean (2006). 
105 Here I am using the term consorteria both in its sense of family-alliance and in its sense of patrilineage. 
Kent (1977) has emphasized that in the Renaissance the word “consorteria” came to be more restricted to 
mean “patrilineage” itself. The earlier Dugento meaning of “family alliance” had faded away, along with 
the reality of that form of social organization. Most likely the one main reason for this fade was the 
emergence of the republic, which undercut the military function of patrilineage. 
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sending these motivations down particular organizational trajectories. Dugento 
organizational inventions were secular recombinations of social relations and concepts in 
a fundamentally religious tool-kit of practices.106  
 
7. Conclusion 
 If the Tuscan unitary merchant-banks were born because of the pope, they 
survived because of the king of England. Repayment through the customs service turned 
wool into simultaneously a commodity in international trade and a commodity in state 
finance. Wool had to be manufactured into textiles both for merchants to make their 
profit and for the king to make his soldiers. As sedentary merchant-banks expanded, the 
Florence wool textile industry grew and the Champagne fairs declined.  
 This autocatalytic trajectory lasted until the famous bankruptcies of the Bardi and 
the Peruzzi companies in Florence in 1342. In truth, this trading system had been in 
decline since the turn of the century. The Bonsignori company went bankrupt in 129x. 
The Ricciardi went bankrupt in 130x. The Scali went bankrupt in 130x. The Frescobaldi 
went bankrupt in 131x. My data from the Florentine banking guild’s annual registration 
of banks traces a grim picture of steady decline from 1299 onwards: … 
 Basically these declines were due to a series of wars between the king of England 
and the king of France. Secular wars between France and England were not as profitable 
for Tuscan merchant-banks as were the ‘holy’ crusades in the peninsula of Italy. The 
reason for this difference is related directly to the flow of wool, which passed through 
France. The Italian crusades and the fiscal reforms of Edward I had fueled that flow, but 
subsequent wars with France by Edwards II and III had disrupted it. The king of France 
never adopted the innovative state-finance methods of pope Urban IV. King Philip the 
Fair of France attacked England in part by jailing Italian merchants resident in France and 
confiscating their goods. In the name of usury. The kings of England in their turn, with 
their smooth state finance failing, short-sightedly also jailed their own bankers and 
confiscated their goods.107 In spite of his questionable credit rating, for a while one 
                                                 
106 The tool-kit metaphor and idea is borrowed from Swidler (19xx). The train switchman metaphor, which 
influenced Swidler, is Weber’s. Baxandall also a relevant cite. 
107 This perhaps being one benefit of outsourcing state finance. 
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Tuscan banker replaced another in the king’s service: the Ricciardi company was 
followed by the Frescobaldi company, which was followed by the Bardi company. 
Eventually profits in the wool trade were not sufficient to offset their shabby royal 
treatment. At end Bardi were owed by Edward III the equivalent of an entire year’s 
English production in wool [check this figure] Edward wouldn’t pay it, and the 
organizational invention whose birth has been analyzed in this chapter became extinct. 
Busts following booms have been with us in history for a long time. 
 Ultimate extinction notwithstanding, the Tuscan unitary merchant bank was an 
amazing invention, especially for its time. Bills of exchange and account books changed 
banking forever, and the Commercial Revolution moved Europe out of its economic 
backwater. Dare I utter that historiographically out-of-fashion sentiment that the Middle 
Ages ended?108 
 For us as social scientists, the lessons are “extension and absorption” as another 
multiple-network folding mechanism for organizational genesis, with catalytic spillover 
into neighboring networks to reproduce and grow that genesis. None of this medieval 
invention in banking was inevitable, but “historical contingency” does not have to mean a 
great idea, a great man, or even an accident. Multiple systems can feed back into each 
other occasionally to produce unpredictable tipping effects, when such interacting 
systems are poised. Properly understood to exclude teleology and social Darwinism, 
nonlinear path dependence is as characteristic of social evolution as it is of biological 
evolution. 
 
                                                 
108 To the extent of course that anything in history is really over. I don’t mean to imply that I place all the 
credit for the Renaissance on the doorsteps of these merchant banks. At very least, the political rebirth of 
republicanism, and the effect that had on suppressing domestic (certainly not foreign) violence, should get 
much credit as well. 
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Bonsignori company 1203: 1250: 1251: 1252:  1253:    1254:    1255:  1256: 
Bonsignore di Bernardo salt 
  
Bonifacius Bonsignoris 4815  5608,6777109 L/6264,6386,6381,6861,6878 7342,7406,7489,7980,8034 XXVIII 
Orlandius Bonsignoris 4815  5608  L/6264,6386,6446,6861 7197,7406   Ch110 (dir.) 1148 
Orlando Bartolomei Malavolti L/5469   6381        Ch 
Aldebrandinus Bartholomei     6381 
Hugolinus Belmontis111  L/5469   L/6264,6386   7197,7489   165  1148 
Capitino Buctin/ Capucino Bucci112            165  1148 
Bartholomeo Guidii Ciabacte             165  1148 
Andrea Iacobi               Ch 
Facius Juncte       L/6264 
Bartholomeo Christophori     6861,6878 
Theobaldum Thebalducii  L/5469 
Rainerium Tetii   L/5469 
Albizo Deuteaute          7342 
 
Bernardino Prosperini Cendonazi    XXIII,XXV,XXIV  8034 
Bonaventure Bernardini      6381,6446   7980    Ch,165,XXVIII 1148 
Aldebrando Aldebrandini     XXIII,XXV       XXVII,XXVIII 
Ruskitello Cambii113      XXIII 
Amanatto Spinetti114      XXIII 
 
 
                                                 
109 First mention as campsor domini papae (actually campsoris nostri). 
110 This reorganization (initiation?) of company connected to Sicilian venture? (See Chiaudano, p. 114.) Scali also mobilized as campsors papae at this time. 
111 In June 1255, part of Tolomei company (English, p. 15). 
112 In June 1255, part of Tolomei company (English, p. 15). 
113 Part of Scali company (though not really consolidated yet). 
114 Part of Scali company (though not really consolidated yet). 
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 Bonsignori company 1261:   1262:     1263: 
Orlandi Bonsignoris  9,L/44,48,51,L186 53,209     157, 220,277,491 
Raynerii Jacobi  9,L/44,48,L186 L/40,73,121,L/179,180,182,209 491 
Bonaventura Bernardini 9,L/44,48,51,L186 L/40,53,73,L/179,182,209  157,159,161,166,172,173,174,175,176,177, 
(continued)           178,220,277,370,480,491,426 
Francisci Guidonis     73,121,L/179,180,182   159,161,166,172,173,176,177,277,370,480,426 
Hugolinus Bellimontis         172,426 
Facius(Bonifacius) Juncte 9   72,76     172,426 
Jacobo Gregorii     L/40,73,180,182   163 
Andree Jacobi   9   L/40,72,76,180,182,209  157,159,163, 220,370,480,491 
Tholomeo Manenti          157,159,163,166,172, 220,370,480,426 
Bonsignori Raynerii  9   73,180,182,209   157,159,163,166,172,220,370,480,491,426 
Manno Ildebrandini     73,209     163,491 
Jacobo Gilli      73     157,220 
Raynerio Bonaccursi  48,51,L186  53,L147    159,163,166,173,220 
Deutavivae Guidi  L/44,48,51,L186  53,L147 
Ildebrando Ildebrandini         173 
Jacopo Ildebrandini          177 
Castraleone Hugolini          177 
Jacopo Romei           177,277 
Gregorio dicto Gonnella         177 
Martinello Rubei          177 
Rostorius Juncte          163 
Bonadota Capud Nigri         163 
Corrado Jacobo  (87) 
Jacobus Curradi          161 
Vivolo Salvanelli  (87)   121,L/179    161,176 
Venturae Cambii  (87)   121     161,176 
Ventura Benedicti     L/179     161 
Lottus Ugolini           161 
___  codes if leadership language (i.e., not in transaction, but referenced). ( ) means not Bonsignori company.
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Bonsignori company (Siena) 1265:   
Orlandi Bonsignoris  1427,731,1428 
Bonaventura Bernardini 1427,726,728,729,730,731,735,738,739,746,747,753,754,755,756,1428,1464,1465,1480,1482 
Raynerii Jacobi  1427,728,729,730,746,747,753,755,756,1428,1465 
Francisci Guidonis  1427,726,728,729,730,731,735,738,739,746,747,748,753,755,756,1428,1464,1465,1469 
Facius(Bonifacius) Juncte 1427,728,746,747,753,1428,1464  
Restauro Juncte  1464,1480 
Andree Jacobi    
Bonsignori Raynerii  1427 
Raynerio Bonaccursi   
Tholomeo Manenti  1427 
Manno Ildebrandini  1427  
Blandum Aldebrandi  1427 
Jacobo Gilii   1427,746,753,1480,1482 
Hugoni Jacobi   1427,728,746,747,753,1428,1464,1480,1482 
Jacobo Egidi   728,747,1464 
Lotto Hugolini  1427,728,746,753,1428,1464 
Gascum Trapillicini  1427,1464,1480,1482 
Bindum Aldebrandini  1427 
Aldebrandum Aldebrandini 1427,729,730,755,756 
Paltonem Deutesalvi  1427,729,730,755,756 
Facium Berignonis  1427,755,756 
Gregorio Peruti  731 
Jacobo Gregorii  738,739 
Vivolum Salvanelli  1427 
Gregorium Rigoli  1427 
Deutaiuvam Guidi  1427 
Bindum Falconis  1427 
Bonfilium Contadini  1427 
Incontratum Philippi  1427 
Jacobum Skermi  1427 
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Conradum Jacobi  1427 
Bettum Ferrantis  1427 
Tholomeum Jacobi  1427 
Thomam Viviani  1427 
Leonardum Jannis  1427 
Facium Ranerii  1427 
Pacchinam Ranerii  1427 
Meum Monaldetti   1427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sources: numbers are papal bull #s; hence connected to papal curia. 
 Latin numbers are Liberate Roll #s; hence connected to king of England 
“Ch” refers to info from Chiaudano; “L” refers to info from Lunt; “E” refers to info from English. 
colors: red = France (anywhere else); blue = England; pink = Montpelier; orange = Champagne; green = Spain; purple = Charles of Anjou 
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Bonsignori company  1266:      1267: 
Orlandi Bonsignoris  761,789     798, 
Bonaventura Bernardini 761,779,783,784,794,1483,1484  797,798, 
Raynerii Jacobi  761,779, L173 
Francisci Guidonis  779,780,781,783,784,788,1483,1484 
Facius(Bonifacius) Juncte 779,784,1483,1484, L173 
Guidoni Juncte  1483,1484     803,804 
Restauro Juncte  1483,1484     804 
Hugoni Jacobi   783,1483,1484    803,804 
Raynerio Jacobi  783,1483 
Andree Jacobi   761 
Bonsignori Raynerii  761 
Manno Ildebrandini  761 
Raynerio Bonaccursi   
Tholomeo Manenti 
Jacobo Gilii    
Jacobo Egidi   1483,1484 
Lotto Hugolini  779,784,1483,1484    798 
Aldebrando Aldebrandini  
Jacobo Aldobrandini        797 
Paltono Deutesalvi   
Gregorio Peruti   
Jacobo Gregorii  794 
Pultrono Frederici  794 
Facio Berignonis   
Gasconi Trapillicino  1483,1484 
Bartholomeo Henrici  1484      803 
Gregorio Gonnelle        798 
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Mario Chiaudono (1935), p. 134-35: 
 “Soci e capitani della Compagnia dei figli di Bonsignore  
(Societas filioum Bonsignoris) nel 1289: 
 
 Figli di Orlando Bonsignore: 
1. Fatius eques 
2. Ugo 
3. Guilelmus 
4. Bonsignore 
Figlio di Bonifazio Bonsignore: 
5. Nicolaus eques 
Soci estranei alla famiglia Bonsignori e loro capitali: 
6. Bonaventura Bernardini     6800 lib. 
7. Rainerius Iacobi      5200 lib. 
8. Pagnus Giliocti      3000 lib. 
9. Fatius Berignonis      3000 lib. 
10. Conradus Berignonis     2500 lib. 
11. Manfredus Ranucii de Balzis    3000 lib. 
12. Gerius Montanini      3000 lib. 
13. Mevius domini Orlandi de Malavoltis   2500 lib. 
14. Bindus Aldobrandi     2500 lib. 
15. Tura Bartholomei      2500 lib. 
16. Claritus Iohannis      2500 lib. 
17. Thalomeus Manentis     2100 lib. 
18. Ventura o Tura Bonamici     1500 lib. 
19. Arbor Bernardini      1200 lib. 
20. Bartholomeus Henrici     ___ 
21. Vannes Henrici      ___ 
22. Mattheus Albizi      ___ 
23. Angelus Benvenuti     ___ 
Total capital       40,800 lib. 
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Scali company (Florence) 1229: 1233: 1235: 1245: 1249: 1250: 1253: 1254:  1255: 1256: 1257: 1258: 1259: 
Mainetto Robertin     XV 
Bonaccorso Inglesk   B:Eng. 
Amieri Cose   B:Engl.B:Eng.B:Eng. XV        B:Eng.B:Eng. 
Spigliato Cambii115  B:England B:Eng. XV      B:Gasc.B:Eng.116 
Rocco(Rustichello) Cambii117  B:Eng.    XXIII XXVI  B:Gasc.B:Eng.B:Eng.XXXIII XXXV,XXXVII 
Manetto Spini(Spineti)   B:Eng.  B:Eng. XXI XXIII XXVI  B:Gasc.B:Eng.B:Eng. 
Pietro Benincase118           B:Gasc.B:Eng. 
Ranieri Abbati              B:Eng. 
Hugoni(dicto Mazze) Simonetti     XXI      B:Eng. 
Deuteayuto Guillelmi             B:Eng. 
Jacopo della Scala      B:Eng.(+others)          7529  B:Gascony 
Cavalcante(Cante) de Scala            B:Eng.  
 
Jacobi Giberti119        7069 7529,7227 
Hugoni Gilberti       XXI 
Benvenuto Will’i       XXI 
Gerardo Ricobaldi       XXI 
Bernardo Persperin120        XXIII 
Aldebrando Aldebrandini121       XXIII      XXXIII XXXV 
Jacobo Dananzaci              XXXIII XXXV 
Berardo Ricobaldi              XXXIII XXXV 
Petro de Sabaudia                XXXVII 
Luterio Bonycase                XXXVII 
                                                 
115 Due to strange English spellings, I assume Spigliato Cambi = Spinello Campano.  
116 These loans part of Sicilian venture: a papal-English taxation joint venture. But also some of them straight to king. Jordan, p.11, says Scali made campsor papae. 
117 Rocco Cambi = Rustichello Cambi, according to both Borsari and Kay. [See article by Richard Kay in Studi Danteschi on his suicide.] 
118 Due to strange English spellings, I assume Pietro Benincase = Petro Bonacaso. 
119 As of 1262, he is in Bellindotti company. 
120 As of 1255, his son, Benvenuto Bernardini, is part of Bonsignori company of Siena. 
121 As of 1255, this Sienese is part of Bonsignori company. 
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sources: numbers are papal bull #s; hence connected to papal curia. 
Latin numbers are Liberate Roll #s; hence connected to king of England. 
“B:” info from Borsari. 
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Scali company (Florence)  1261:  1262:  1263:   1264:  1265: 1268: 1269: 
England: 
Jacobum Cambii          1012 
Diritta(Dricta) Cambii      A,363   519 
Rucco(Rustichello) Cambii122 XXXVIII B:p/E,L/125 A,363,479,327 519 
Manetto(Maynetto) Spine  XXXVIII B:p/E,L/125 A,363,479  519  1469 
Lotherio Benincase     B:p/E  A,363,479  519,1012 
Ranieri Abbati              B:p/E,L/125 A,363,479,327 519   XLI XLIII,XLIV,XLV 
Hugonetto(Mace) Simonetti             XLIII,XLIV,XLV 
Florence and elsewhere: 
Amieri Cose    B:p    A,363   519,1012 
Jacobus(Lapus) Amierii Cose  B:p    A,363,212  519,1012 
Jacopo de Scala   B:p  B:p/E,L/125 A,363,327  519,1012 726 
Cavalcante(Cante) Jacobi de Scala B:p,22    A,363,212  519,1012 
Spina Jacobi de Scala   B:p    A,363,212  519,1012 
Teghia Jacobi de Scala      A,363,212  519  1469 
Thomasio(Maso) Spiliati  B:p,22    A,363,212  519  1469 
Pietro Benincase   B:p  B:p/E,L/125 A,363   519,1012 
Dino Perini    B:p  B:p/E,L/125 
Jacobo Lecca    B:p    A,363,212  519  726 
Campana Francisci   B:p    A,363,212  519,1012 
Hugo(Ugo) Spine   B:p    A,363   519 
Teghia Amadoris   B:p    A,363,212  519 
Gerardinus Beliotti   B:p    212 
Rustichello Tedaldi   B:p 
 
sources: numbers are papal bull #s; hence connected to papal curia. “p” means pope. 
Latin numbers are Liberate Roll #s; hence connected to king of England. “p/E” means pope/England relations.  
“B:” info from Borsari; “L” info from Lunt; “A” info from Arias: “Sottomissione dei Banchieri Fiorentini alla Chiesa.” 
                                                 
122Cambii family later becomes the magnate family of de Mozzi. Therefore, Mozzi (also Spini) banks spins out of Scali bank.  
 56
Scali company  1282 & 1284: 
[from Edouard Jordan] 
 
Cieffus Bonisegne  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Maynettus Hugonis   Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Lapus de Scala  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Jacobus Aymerii Cosae  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Johannes Aymerii Cosae  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Albertus Aymerii Cosae Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Folia Aymerii Cosae  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Alamannus Aymerii Cosae Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Castellanus Lapi  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Lippus Petri Benincasae Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Riccasrdus Petri Benincasae Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Tegla Amadoris  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Bonacosa Cosa Fulchi Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Ugolinus de Vichio  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Lotherius Bonaguide  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
Bonapresa Importuni  Martini IV die 13 septembris 1282 et die 13 augusti 1284 datis 
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Tolomei company (Siena)  1223: 1226: 1227: 1230: 1243: 1248: 1251-3:1231253: 1254: 1255: 1255:124 1255:
 1257: 1260:  
Ranierio Raulii     M:lc 
Catalano di Alfano    M:lc 
Bartolomeo di Guazzolino   M:lc 
Manente d’Uguccione   EM:cl. M:lc 
Tolomeo di Tolomeo della Piazza EM:cl. M:lc M:lc M:lc 
Tavena di Tolomeo Tolomei     M:lc   M:lc   453 
Lotterengo di Tolomeo Tolomei    M:lc   M:lc 
Pelacane di Tolomeo Tolomei    M:lc   M:lc 
Jacopo della Piazza 
Tolomeo di Jacobo Tolomei        M:lc   453 M:p ME:p   
Cristoforo di Tolomeo Tolomei      M:lc       E:Ch 
Jacobo di Tolomeo Tolomei         M:lc      E:Ch. 
Rinaldo di Jacobo Tolomei        M:lc   453 M:p ME:p E:Ch. 
Cristoforo di Jacopo Tolomei     .   M:lc  
Andrea di Cristoforo Tolomei        6468   M:p ME:p,28,29   
Lotterengo d’Uguccione Tolomei       M:lc     E:p  E:Eng. 
Bartolomeo di Pietro Tolomei            ME:p,28,29 
 
Orlando Bonasera       347  M:lc    M:p 
Deutaviva di Guido          6468   M:p ME:p,28,29 
Turchio di Ranieri          6468   M:p 
Leo di Teodorico             M:p 
Ofriduccio di Rustibello            M:p 
Dietisalve di Benintende            M:p 
Accarigi di Ranuccio             M:p 
Petrus Montanarius              29 
                                                 
123 The loans below are from various combinations of these Tolomei, over this period of time. Not clearly integrated into unified block of soci yet. 
124 This, on the other hand, is a single loan to pope. (Mucciarelli, 1995, pp. 99-100) 
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Johannes Cesarii              29 
     1223: 1226: 1227: 1230: 1243: 1248: 1251-3:1251253: 1254: 1255:126 1255: 1257:
 1260: 
 
Raynaldus Renerii          6468 7981 
Jacobi Theci           6468 
Luca Ricovarii          6468 
 
Montanino Deutesalve      347   6468 
Bartholomeo Comitis       347 
Henrico Deuteaiut       347 
Jacobo Rustikino       347 
Hugolino Gentili       347 
Albizo Deuteaiut       347 
 
Capitano di Bucce127             ME:p 
Ugolino di Belimonte128            ME:p 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125 The loans below are from various combinations of these Tolomei, over this period of time. Not clearly integrated into unified block of soci yet. 
126 This, on the other hand, is a single loan to pope. (Mucciarelli, 1995, pp. 99-100) 
127 Also partner in Bonsignori company. 
128 Also partner in Bonsignori company. 
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 “cl.” = cloth; “lc” = loan to city; “p” = pope; “v” = vescovo; “Ch.” = Champagne; “Eng.” = England; “Fl.” = Flanders. 
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Tolomei company (Siena)   1262: 1263: 1264: 1265:  1269:   1279: 
Orlando di Baldistricca Tolomei E:Siena 
Tolomeo di Jacobo Tolomei   E:Siena    E:exile 
Pietro di Cristoforo Tolomei  E:Siena175  745 
Andrea di Cristoforo Tolomei  E:Ch. 175 521? 745,E:Ch. E:Ch. 
Minus di Cristoforo Tolomei   175 
Guillelmus et     175  
Meus Raynaldi, eorum nepotes  175 
Tholomei Reginaldi      745 
Christofori Tholomei      745 
Lotheringi Uguicionis      745 
 
Federigo Doni    E:Fl. 175  745,E:Eng. E:Fl. 
Tebaldus Alteville    175 
Bartholomeus et Aringherius Jacobi   521? 
 
 
 
Tolomeo di Rinaldo Tolomei          E:Siena 
Luca di Bonsignore           E:Ch. 
Tofano di Bonsignore           E:Ch. 
Cino di Pietro            E:Ch. 
 
 
[To be honest, apart from the heavy and repeated business of the Tolomei family, this not really solidly consistent. 
Still a fluid partnership structure, even with noble family participation. The pope mobilized by creating the combined  
Scotti-Tolomei company (even if short-lived), not by using this regular Tolomei one very consistently.] 
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Scotti and Tolomei company (Siena) 1255: 1256: 1258: 1262:129 
Petrus Scotti Dominici   J M:p J 46 
Rinaldus Tolomei    J  J 
Tholomeo Raynaldi       46 
Reinaldum Rainerii130     M:p 
Gregorius Bernardini      J 46 
Lotteringus Corradi      J 46 
Jacobus Raynaldi      J 46 
Christoforus Tolomei     M:p J 46 
Raynucius(Raynerius) de Vallestricte   J 46 
Aldebrandinus Tholomei     J 46   
Petrus Christophori      J 46 
Raynucius(Raynalducio) Johannis    J 46 
Bonuncuntrus Scotti Dominici    J 46 
Scotto Dominici       46 
Jacobus Romei      J 46 
Rubeus Consilii      J 46 
Raynerius Citadini      J 46 
Paulus Albertini      J 46 
Jacobus Balioni      J 
Ventura Martini      J 
Bonrestorus Scotti      J 
Jacobus Ugolini      J 
Bonagratia Ardimanni     J 
Bencivenne Consilii      J 
 
 
                                                 
129 This actually ‘trial’ of Scotti-Tolomei bank by pope Urban IV. Alexander IV had appointed this company as campsores papae, but for some reason 
Urban IV unhappy with them.   
130 This guy shows up a lot in early papal refs, connected to other partners. Track these down & staple together (in 1256 only?) 
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Ventura Fornari     M:Eng. 
Raniero Barbotti     M:Eng. 
Ermino Erminii      M:Eng. 
Giacomo Teci      M:Eng. 
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Ricciardi company (Lucca)   122?: 1227: 1231: 1234: 1241: 1245: 1247: 1251: 1253: 1254-5:  1256:  1263:  1266: 
Paganino Guidiccioni       P:Luc. 
Aldibrandino Guidiccioni         BP:Luc. 
Bandino del Lucano Bugianensis        BP:Luc. 
Opizi(Opitone) Malisardi         BP:Luc. 
 
Ricciardo di Graziano di Ricciardo, tintor P:Luc. P:Luc. BP:Luc.P:Luc. BP:Luc. BP:Luc. 
Perfetto di Graziano di Ricciardo    BP:Luc.  BP:Luc.    
Gottifredo di Conetto [uncle?]    BP:Luc. 
Orlandino del Antelmino Minusvetti  
Alamanno (monete contraffatte)  P:Lucca 
Rosselmo del Mainetto Minusvetti  P:Lucca 
Mainetto Minusvetti    P:Lucca 
maestro Giovanni    P:Genoa 
Orlandino Arnolfi        BP:Luc. 
Guglielmo Rosciompelli       BP:Luc. 
 
Peregrino Sesmundi        BP:Luc.K:England RK:Eng.K:Eng.RKP:Eng.  
Reynero detto Senaci Guidiccioni(?)        K:England R:Eng.   RKP:Eng. 
Henrico Saraceni            RK:Eng.K:Eng.RKP:Eng. 
Bartholomeo Bendini              RKP:Eng. 
Luco(Luke) Natali              RKP:Eng.K:Eng.K:Eng. 
Reiner Magiari                    K:Eng. 
 
Baroncinus di Gu(W)alterius de Vulturna            (K:Eng.)(K:Eng.) 
 
Richardo Guidechonis               (K:Cham) 
Theobaldino Maniumac               (K:Cham) 
Guido Panichi: procurator only                (P:Genoa) 
 
( ) = not yet part of comp    
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Ricciardi company (Lucca)  1272: 1273: 1276-83: 1283: 1284: 1286:  
dominus Andree Parentii Ricciardi       A:Luc. 
Philippi domini Raynerii Ricciardi       A:Luc. 
Ricciardus domini Raynerii Ricciardi      A:Luc. 
Pagani/uccio Guidi Guidiccionis      B:Luc. A:Luc 
Guidiccione Paganini Guidiccionis      B:Luc. A:Luc. 
Raynerii Bandini         A:Luc. 
Philipucii Talgardi         A:Luc. 
Saraceni Macchi   P:G131      A:Luc. 
Iohannis Gambardi         A 
 
Lucasio Natale132 (Luke de Luka) P:G KP:Eng.KP:Eng. L:Eng.  (d.1279) 
Bandino del Lucano    P:Eng. 
Uguccione Maghiari    P:Eng. 
Ranieri(Raynerius) Maghiarii133  K:Eng. RKPL:Eng L:Eng.  A 
Orlandino di Pogio134 (Podio)   RKP:Eng. L:Eng.  [why no A?] 
Henricus de Podio     K:Eng.  L:Eng.  K:Gascony 
Bartolotto del Buggianese Bandini   P:Eng.,Paris L:Eng. B 
Matteo Rosciompelli     RKP:Eng. L:Eng.   
Adiuti Rosciompili     K:Eng.    A 
Vannes Rosciompeli        B A 
Abbate Talgardi     K:Eng.  L:Eng.  A 
Giovanni Simonetti Sismondi  P:G  KP:Eng. L:Eng.  A 
Riccardo Paganini Guidiccionis135  P:G  KP:Eng. L:Eng. B:Luc. [why no A?] 
Tommasinus Paganini Guidi Guidiccionis K:Eng. KP:Eng. L:Eng. B:Luc. A 
Aldebrandino Guidiccioni    K:Eng. 
Federigi Venture     K:Eng.    A 
Riccardo Bonifacii136         K:Eng. 
Baroncino Gualteri137 (in Eng 23 yrs before)  RK:Eng. L:Eng.  K:left comp 
Brunetto Baroncini Gualteri        K:left comp 
Riccardo Baroncini Gualteri        K:left comp 
Opizzo(Opiso) Malisardi   P:G  K:Eng.    K:left comp 
 (inlaw of Gualteri) 
 
Hugolino Rosciompelli   R:Ire. K:Ireland 
Percival Gerarducci     K:Ireland 
Bendino Panichi(Peruchi)  P:G  KP:Ireland   A:Ireland 
Ghirardo Chimbardi         K:Ireland 
Francesco Malisardi         KP:Ireland 
                                                 
131 P:G refers to one-shot loan in 1272 at Genoa to Prince Edward (future Edward I), coming back from crusades.    
See Del Punto, p. 163. 
132 Liberate Roll #s: In 1273: 48, 49, 49b, 50. In 1274: 52, 53, 56, 57, 58. In 1275: 61, 64, 65. In 1276: 68, 71.   
133 Liberate Roll #s: In 1278: 76, 78. In 1279: 79, 82. In 1280: 83,  
134 Liberate Roll #s: In 1277: 72, 73. In 1278: 74, 75, 76, 77. In 1280: 80, 80b, 84. In 1296: 95. 
135 Liberate Roll #s: In 1281: 86. In 1289: 89. In 1290: 90, 93. In 1292: 94. 
136 Liberate Roll #s: In 1290: 90, 93. 
137 Liberate Roll #s: In 1281: 85, 86. In 1282: 87. In 1285: 88. 
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Ricciardi company (Lucca)  1272: 1273: 1276-83: 1283: 1284: 1286: 
 (continued) 
Riccardo Rosciompelli    K:Gascony 
Francesco Maneumach    K:Paris 
Lotto Aldebrandini     K:Paris 
Bindo di Giovanni Simonetti    P:Paris? 
Barchetta Barche     P:Paris?  B 
Ricciardinus domini Bonfatii Gottori      B 
 
Labro Volpelli     K:Eng. KP:curia   KP:curia 
Dino Tadolini      P:curia 
 
Frederigus Sarracini Incallocchiati       A:Ravenna 
Nicolucius Bonacursii Mignosii       A:Ravenna 
 
Guido Panichi, procurator only138  (P:Gen.) 
Bandino de Fondora, procurator only  (P:Gen.)  
 
 
[sources: R = Re; K = Kaeuper; B = Blomquist; P = Del Punto; L = Lunt; A = Arias] 
                                                 
138 The exception that proves rule? Genoa uses agents, not filiali.  
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Ricciardi company (Lucca)   1286:   Pope Martin IV 
dominus Andree Parentii Ricciardi  A:Luc. 
Philippi domini Raynerii Ricciardi  A:Luc. 
Ricciardus domini Raynerii Ricciardi A:Luc. 
Pagani/uccio Guidi Guidiccionis  A:Luc   J 
Guidiccione Paganini Guidiccionis  A:Luc. 
Franciscus Guiditionis      J 
Raynerii Bandini    A:Luc.   J 
Philipucii Talgardi    A:Luc. 
Saraceni Macchi    A:Luc.   J 
Iohannis Gambardi    A 
 
Ranieri(Raynerius) Maghiarii   A   J 
Orlandino di Pogio139 (Podio)  [why no A?]  J 
Henricus de Podio    K:Gascony 
Riccardus Pogii       J 
Bartolotto del Buggianese Bandini     J  
Adiuti(Adjustus) Rosciompili   A   J 
Vannes Rosciompeli    A 
Abbate Talgardi    A 
Giovanni Simonetti Sismondi   A   J 
Riccardo Paganini Guidiccionis140   [why no A?]  J 
Tommasinus Paganini Guidi Guidiccionis A   J 
Aldebrandino Guidiccioni 
Lotto Aldebrandini       J  
Federigi Venture    A 
Riccardo Bonifacii141    K:Eng. 
Bendino Panichi(Peruchi)   A:Ireland 
Ghirardo Chimbardi    K:Ireland 
Francesco Malisardi    KP:Ireland 
 
Labro Volpelli     KP:curia  J 
Dino Tadolini        J 
Vantes Honestis       J 
 
Ricciardinus domini Bonfatii Gottori     J 
Paganellus seu Nellus Gualandi     J 
Ghinus Christophori       J 
Bonaventura Romanioli      J 
Nicolutius Liene       J 
Banus Pili Rictii       J 
 
[sources: A = Arias: J = Jordan] 
                                                 
139 Liberate Roll #s: In 1296: 95. 
140 Liberate Roll #s: In 1289: 89. In 1290: 90, 93. In 1292: 94. 
141 Liberate Roll #s: In 1290: 90, 93. 
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1263-64 companies absolved from excommunication142 143 144 
[bull numbers from Registres d’Urbain IV, vol. 2.] 
 
1) de Burgo company of Florence  [n. 362: 5 August 1263]   
Dulcis de Burgo     
Boldus de Burgo       
Hugo Monaldi      
Moczius de Burgo     
Gualterus de Burgo     
Gerus de Burgo     
Castra Gualfredi     
Hugettus Symonetti     
Spinellus Symonetti      
Donatellus Octaviani     
Dulcis Octaviani     
Johannes Bonaviti      
Rubeus Bacharelli        
Lapus Stibaldi      
Johannutius Bajamontis     
Ranutius Ardingi     
       
2) Rimbertini company of Florence [n. 364: 27 August 1263] 
Philippus Radulphi 
Frankettus Rembertini 
 Maynettus Rembertini 
 Jacobus Rembertini 
 Franciscus Rembertini  
 Frankettus Bencivenni 
 Raynaldus Uberti 
 Dosius Uberti 
 Ubertus Raynaldi 
Pucius Raynaldi 
 Guelfus Raynaldi  
Scolarius Radulphi 
Rota Amannati 
Michael Amannati 
Bucca Amannati 
Matheus Bonfilioli 
Cantius Symonetti 
Bonvicinus Nicolai 
                                                 
142 This procedure makes these lists of partners complete, unlike the usual case with papal transactions. 
143 The Bonsignori, Scali and Tolomei companies are not listed here, because they were coded elsewhere in 
the appendix. Their Urban IV bull numbers and dates of absolution were the following, respectively: n. 
161, 5 July 1263; n. 363: 27 August 1263; and n. 175, 5 January 1263. 
144 Discipuli or non-partner employees were also included in the registers, but these not reproduced here.  
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3) Bardi company of Florence  [n. 410: 27 September 1263]  
 Gianni Bonaguide Bardi    
 Matheus Bonaguide Bardi    
 Lapus Bonaguide Bardi     
 Coltus Bonaguide Bardi       
 Riccus Beltrami     
 Guarnerius Mathei 
 Antoninus, filius Gerii 
 
4) Bellicozi company of Florence  [n. 411: 26 September 1263] 
 Cambius Manerii Bellicozi 
 Persus Manerii Bellicozi 
 Perus Manerii Bellicozi 
 Giannianus Tebaldi 
 Zione Tebaldi 
 
5) Bellincioni company of Florence  [n. 428: 23 October 1263]  
 Ildebrandinus Bellincionis 
 Bellincione(Cione) Ildebrandinus Bellincionis 
 Cambiutius Ildebrandinus Bellincionis 
 Caccia (notarius) Bonciani 
 Cenni Bonciani    
 
6) Benvenuti del Bene company of Florence [n. 429: 27 October 1263] 
 Ildebrandinus Benvenuti del Bene 
 Franciscum Benvenuti del Bene 
 Phylippus Benvenuti del Bene 
 Ugolinus Benvenuti del Bene 
 
7) Acquerelli ‘company’ of Florence  [n. 430: 2 November 1263] 
 Ildebrandinus (judex) Gerardi de Acquerellis 
 Giacottus Gerardi de Acquerellis 
 Peroctus Gerardi de Acquerellis 
 Roggerus (patruus suus) quondam Ildebrandini de Acquerellis  
 Dinus Joseppi 
 Cervellinus(Cinus) Dini Joseppi 
 [but word ‘socii’ not used in this ‘company’] 
 
8) de Bella company of Florence  [n. 447: 10 November 1263]  
 Comparinus Tedaldi de Bella    
 Janus Tedaldi de Bella     
 Hugo Melioris de Bella 
 Gabriel Donati Bucetunde 
 Dessus Donati Bucetunde 
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9) Puccii et Dosii Albizi of Florence [n. 463: 5 December 1263] 
 Dosius quondam Albizi 
 Pepus(Puccius) quondam Albizi 
 
10) Vinciguerre company of Florence [n. 465: 23 December 1263] 
 Duccius Rogeri Vinciguerre 
 Nerus Rogeri Vinciguerre 
 Rusticus Rogeri Vinciguerre 
 
11) Phylippi company of Florence  [n. 501: 5 February 1264] 
 Cambius Phylippi 
 Raynerius Phylippi  
 Capiardinus Guillelmi Danielis 
 Lapus Bizochi Marci 
 Marcutius Bizochi Marci 
 
12) Rossi company of Florence  [n. 557: 29 April 1264] 
 Johannes Rossi 
 Catellus Rossi 
 Marus Rossi 
 Rossus Conradi(Cafagii) 
 
13) Abbati ‘company’ of Florence  [n. 570: 14 May 1264] 
 Lambertus(Tuctius) Abbatis 
 Jacobus (clericus et procurator) Abbatis 
 [but word ‘socii’ not used in this ‘company’] 
  
14) Cerchi founder in Florence (not company) [n. 574: 28 May 1264] 
 Circulum Olivieri 
 
15) Frescobaldi company of Florence [n. 701: 3 August 1264] 
 Bardus Lamberti Frascobaldi 
 Jacobus Lamberti Frascobaldi 
 Coppus Joseppi 
 Corbolinus Bencii 
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16) Donosdei company of Pistoia [n. 702: 3 August 1264] 
 Egidius Donosdei 
 Melior Pelegrini 
 Accursis Lesii 
 Bonadies Bonadiei 
Henrigetti Bonadiei 
 Pecora Novanterii 
 Stancollus(Collus) Raynuzini 
 Meo (domini) Raynuzini 
 Matheus Thomasini 
 Bindus Armaleonis 
 
17) Ammannati company of Pistoia [n. 703: 30 July 1264] 
 Bandinus Ammannati 
 Bartholomeus Ammannati 
 Framericus Baldeti 
 Fuccius Soffredi 
 Forese Jacobi 
 Corradutius Jacobi 
 Sarracenus Jacobi 
 Conte Montancolli 
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1265 companies absolved from excommunication 
[bull numbers from Registres de Clement IV]  
 
18) Cerchi “societate” of Florence (again) [Clement IV n. 86: 2 juin 1265] 
 Circuli Oliverii Circuli 
 Bindus Galligaii de Mactis 
 Teglarius Tedaldi 
 Ubertus Cambii 
 Manfridus Oderici  
Naddus Boniczi  
Taldus Raynerii  
Guiducius Oderici  
Naddus Boniczi 
Taldus Raynerii  
Guiducius Cavalcanti  
Bonsignore Bonaiuti 
 
19) Frescobaldi company of Florence (again) [Clement IV n. 87: 3 June 1265] 
 Jacobus Riccomandi 
Albertinus Rote 
 Ghinus Fruscobaldi  
 Barduccius Lamberti Fruscobaldi 
Jacobus Lamberti Fruscobaldi 
 Hugolinus Benivieni  
Coppus Joseppi 
Rainerius Joseppi 
Corbolinus Benivi  
Meliorellus Allioni  
Puccinus Amatoris  
Restorinus Spiliati 
 
20) Rubei et Arditionis company of Florence [Clement IV n. 143: 13 July 1265] 
 Fuctius Rubei 
 Cinus Jacobi Arditionis 
 Ricchus Jacobi 
 Julianus Ricchi 
 Clarus Oliverii 
 Riccus Bonaguide 
 Nerus Fornarii 
 Angelerius Bonelle  
Petrus Corbizi  
Ricchus Salvaterre 
 
21) Rimbottus Bonaiuti of Siena [Clement IV n. 158: 23 October 1265] 
 Rimbottus Bonaiuti 
 Tucius et Acherisius, filii ejus 
